As Operation Epic Fury and Operation Roaring Lion dismantle the Iranian regime’s nuclear and military infrastructure, Iranian Kurdish opposition groups have expressed willingness to join the fight – even though U.S. objectives are not premised on supporting or arming a local force. Iranian Kurdish groups created a new front – the Coalition of Political Forces of Iranian Kurdistan – to stretch Iranian security forces and control key border areas and strategic corridors. The Iranian Kurdish front also aims to help overthrow the Islamic Republic of Iran and realize Kurdish self-determination in a democratic Iran.
To date, many analysts and pundits have criticized Iranian Kurdish involvement in the war. Some argue that they should not join the fight without concrete promises because the United States (U.S.) has a track record of ‘abandoning’ the Kurds. Others fear that arming Iranian Kurdish opposition groups would stir Persian nationalism, incite secessionism, and help the Iranian regime to reconsolidate.
As Operation Epic Fury and Operation Roaring Lion dismantle the Iranian regime’s nuclear and military infrastructure, Iranian Kurdish opposition groups have expressed willingness to join the fight – even though U.S. objectives are not premised on supporting or arming a local force. Iranian Kurdish groups created a new front – the Coalition of Political Forces of Iranian Kurdistan – to stretch Iranian security forces and control key border areas and strategic corridors. The Iranian Kurdish front also aims to help overthrow the Islamic Republic of Iran and realize Kurdish self-determination in a democratic Iran.
To date, many analysts and pundits have criticized Iranian Kurdish involvement in the war. Some argue that they should not join the fight without concrete promises because the United States (U.S.) has a track record of ‘abandoning’ the Kurds. Others fear that arming Iranian Kurdish opposition groups would stir Persian nationalism, incite secessionism, and help the Iranian regime to reconsolidate.
These views are overstated and miscalculate realities on the ground. Kurdish opposition groups in Iraq, Türkiye, Syria, and Iran have served as auxiliary and partner forces for decades without formalized agreements. Throughout the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988), for instance, different Kurdish peshmerga groups aligned with foreign governments and at times against each other to fight. Kurdish militia groups in Syria willingly accepted U.S. and other foreign assistance to help defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), knowing that this assistance was temporary, transactional, and tactical. Iraq Kurds have maintained their important partnership with the U.S. even though past assistance was short-lived.
Similarly, Iranian Kurdish opposition groups are not passive actors. They will fight if the right incentives and strategic conditions exist. Like other non-state armed groups, they benefit from external patronage to advance their political agenda, gain semi-legitimacy, and enhance their military capabilities.
Concern about Iranians “rallying around the flag” in response to armed Iranian Kurdish opposition groups is exaggerated. It assumes a national cohesion that does not exist in the Islamic Republic today. Some Iranian diaspora nationalist opposition groups, especially those led by Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi, have vocally criticized the Iranian Kurdish alliance as separatists who threaten Iran’s territorial integrity. Yet Persian Iranians are divided between regime loyalists, reformists, nationalists, and a growing anti‑regime youth population. Non-Persian groups that comprise half of Iran’s population – Kurds, Baluch, Arabs, Azeris- are equally diverse. Iranian Kurds, who represent about 10 percent of the Iranian population, are about 60 percent Sunni Muslim, 35 percent Shi’a Muslim, and five percent heterodox and minority groups with different dialects and local and tribal affiliations. This heterogeneity creates complex group affiliations that extend beyond ethnonationalism and separatism.
The issue, therefore, is not whether Iranian Kurds are willing to fight or whether arming the Kurdish opposition will reinforce Persian nationalism. Rather, it is about the effectiveness of Iranian Kurds as an opposition force.
The key challenge here is military capabilities. For decades Iranian Kurdish peshmerga forces have trained and fought in the mountains and conducted cross-border raids against the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and at times other Kurdish peshmerga forces. Yet Iranian Kurdish peshmerga – numbering in the hundreds or thousands – have not fought in a full-scale war since the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s. These peshmerga forces have light weapons but lack air defense systems and armored vehicles. They have limited experience with modern warfare. Unlike their counterparts in Iraq, Turkey, and Syria, Iranian Kurdish forces also lack strong leadership (as many leaders have been assassinated by the Iranian regime) and effective political institutions that could provide strategic direction, build capacity, and ensure durability of efforts.
To be sure, individual groups have conducted successful operations against Iranian regime forces for decades. One of the most active and capable fighting forces is the Party for Free Life of Kurdistan (PJAK). PJAK is an affiliate of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), which is an officially designated terrorist organization by the U.S., European Union, NATO, and other U.S. allies. According to a recent Congressional Research Service report, from 2015-2025 PJAK attacks accounted for about 70 percent of all confirmed attacks by Iranian Kurdish opposition groups against the regime. PJAK can also potentially draw upon the thousands of PKK fighters from its base in the Qandil Mountains in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq.
Still, PJAK is just one organization. Iranian Kurdish opposition groups are not a cohesive fighting force. The six groups that comprise the Coalition of Political Forces in Iranian Kurdistan are divided politically and militarily. Fissures are between conservative and leftist nationalist, tribal and urban groups, and/or those tied to the two main Iraqi Kurdish political parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) led by Masoud Barzani and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), led by Bafel Talabani. Some groups are fragmented within. For instance, when I visited the Komala opposition forces camp in Sulaymaniyah in the 2000s, I had to meet with two distinct groups at different localities in the same neighborhood. These fragmentations continue today and affect group loyalties and allegiances of local populations.
Further, while PJAK is the most militarily capable group, it comes with the greatest political risk. PJAK poses a security threat to the Turkish government, which is a NATO member and important U.S. ally. A resurgent PJAK would raise alarm in Ankara, create new strains on the U.S.-Turkey strategic partnership, enhance tensions between Turkey and Israel, and fuel regional instability. Turkey has targeted PJAK operations in the past and could continue to do so.
An activated Iranian Kurdish opposition force, even in a weakened form, also poses security risks for Iraq. Even before the war commenced, the Iranian regime and its proxy forces conducted missile and drone attacks against U.S. military bases, diplomatic facilities, and oil and gas installations in the country. Iranian strikes on oilfields across Iraq, including a U.S. oilfield in the Kurdistan Region operated by the U.S. firm HKN Energy, have temporarily halted production. Iran could also close parts of the 200-mile border it shares with the Kurdistan Region and strangle local trade and economies. This is why Iraqi Kurdish leaders do not want to get drawn into the fight. Iraqi Kurdish officials have insisted that “not a single Iraqi Kurd has crossed the border” and that the Kurdistan Region “will not be part of conflicts”. The Iraqi government of Baghdad has taken a similar position.
These realities have implications for any effort to support, engage, and/or arm Iranian Kurds. Iranian Kurdish opposition groups are willing to fight the Iranian regime – despite the abandonment narrative that argues otherwise. Depending on incentives, nature of support, and the operating environment, Iranian Kurdish opposition groups could be an effective although limited asset. They could potentially fill security vacuums, take control of territories, secure and stabilize border areas in western Iran, conduct attacks, disrupt logistics, and share intelligence. Yet, to sustain such activities, Iranian Kurdish opposition groups would need targeted military support, training, and coordination with other anti‑regime actors. Extended support, in turn, could create risks for regional stability and alliance management.
Ultimately, however, Iranian Kurdish opposition groups are unlikely to be effective in achieving their political objectives. Any plans to overthrow the Iranian regime and gain Kurdish autonomy in a democratic Iran will be unattainable without regional backing and internal support – neither of which is currently available nor likely to be so in the near future.
