“When oil prices go up, we make a lot of money,” U.S. President Donald Trump wrote recently. The surge in oil prices, driven by escalating war between the United States, Israel, and Iran, might seem attractive not only to Washington but also to smaller oil-exporting countries seeking to capitalize on the moment. With Brent crude oil prices reaching $100 per barrel, the economic incentives to expand production are strengthening across the global market.
Colombia’s fossil fuel phaseout program and broader energy transition agenda was already a global outlier. Can the country resist the short-term lure of windfall profits from oil exports, especially now, and maintain the political space required to plan and build a post-fossil fuel economy?
During the 2022 presidential campaign, President Gustavo Petro made the energy transition a central pillar of his platform, pledging to end the granting of new licenses for oil and gas exploration, to halt two planned pilot fracking projects, and to prevent the exploitation of unconventional hydrocarbon deposits. These commitments marked a clear break with Colombia’s traditional extractivist development model, which the country had pursued since the mid-1980s, when it significantly increased production and became an oil exporter.
Yet there exists a structural tension at the heart of Colombia’s transition strategy: While the country can credibly claim leadership for driving ambition in the low-carbon transition, its economy is still deeply intertwined with increasingly volatile global fossil fuel markets. Additionally, moving away from an extractivist model is an inherently long-term project. With Petro constitutionally barred from standing for office again, the presidential elections scheduled in May will be a critical juncture for this bold experiment.
Following Petro’s election, his administration released a National Development Plan for 2022-2026 (titled: “Colombia, Potencia Mundial de la Vida,” or “Colombia, World Power of Life”), which sets out a road map for a just energy transition. The plan prioritizes accelerating the deployment of renewable energy, reducing dependence on fossil fuels, combating environmental crimes, and promoting the uptake of zero- and low-emission vehicles. It positioned Colombia as a leading, although contested, experiment in climate-aligned development policy in a rapidly shifting geopolitical energy landscape. Since the adoption of the plan a little more than three years ago, the share of renewable energy in Colombia’s electricity mix has increased from 2 percent to 16 percent.
But Colombia finds itself in a strikingly paradoxical position. In 2024, more than 75 percent of Colombia’s total energy demand was met through fossil fuels. Of that energy, oil comprised more than 40 percent, followed by natural gas and coal. Colombia remains a major exporter of oil and coal, which continue to underpin export revenues and fiscal income, constituting about 10 percent of GDP and 45 percent of total exports in 2024.
A contentious pillar of Petro’s energy agenda has been the pledge to stop issuing new licenses for oil and gas exploration. That 2022 commitment has become one of the most politically fragile elements of the transition. While existing fields would continue to operate, the pledge challenges long-standing basics of economic growth, fiscal revenues, and energy security.
Unsurprisingly, the policy has triggered significant domestic pushback, including infighting within Petro’s own cabinet. Critics inside the government have repeatedly warned that oil exports play a critical role in Colombia’s macroeconomic stability, supporting foreign exchange earnings, public finances, and social spending.
Which brings us to the politics. Among the leading contenders to succeed Petro is Iván Cepeda, who is widely seen as aligned with the left-wing Historic Pact, the coalition that brought Petro to power. Analysts broadly describe Cepeda as the candidate most likely to carry forward Petro’s project, emphasizing continuity on progressive priorities. By contrast, the leading contender, Abelardo de la Espriella, the founder of the pro-democracy movement Defensores de la Patria and widely known as “El Tigre,” is narrowly leading in the latest polls. Running as a right-wing conservative outsider with a platform centered on security and free-market economics, he is believed to be less likely to continue Colombia’s fossil fuel phaseout agenda.
During the March 8 congressional elections, Historic Pact emerged as the largest bloc but failed to secure an outright majority in Congress. This fragmented outcome means that advancing major political reforms will become considerably more challenging. It may also complicate progress on the energy transition, which will require building broad legislative coalitions to pass new regulatory changes. In addition to domestic political leadership Colombia will require substantial international investment to deliver its transition agenda. An estimated $40 billion is needed over the coming decade, as outlined in its energy and economic transition plans. These investments are intended both to scale up renewable energy and other green sectors and to progressively replace revenues that are currently generated from oil and gas.
International investments for clean energy are beginning to come in, although not yet at the scale required. For example, after an initial tranche of $100 million was disbursed in July 2025, the international partnerships and development arm of the European Investment Bank, together with Enel Colombia S.A., part of the Enel Group, announced a new loan of $200 million in November to finance two new solar power projects in Colombia’s Atlántico region to supply renewable electricity to 1.5 million people.
These investments support new government initiatives such as the “Colombia Solar” program, a national strategy announced in September and designed to accelerate a just energy transition by turning existing energy subsidies into sustainable investments in solar technology. Instead of subsidizing traditional electricity costs, the policy aims to deliver solar panels and associated equipment directly to households, particularly in lower-income strata.
Expanding solar power at the scale and speed that Colombia requires will inevitably depend on deeper trade and investment ties with China, given its dominant role in supplying affordable solar panels, batteries, and associated clean energy technologies. In May 2025, Colombia formally signed up to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, following a bilateral meeting between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Petro during Petro’s visit to Beijing.
For China, closer ties with Colombia offer access to new export markets at a time when it is actively seeking to scale overseas deployment of solar photovoltaic and wind power technologies, batteries, and electric vehicles amid tightening trade conditions in Europe and North America. For Colombia, engagement under the initiative is framed as a way to attract investment and technology to support its just energy transition agenda, accelerating renewable energy deployment and clean transport infrastructure while reducing reliance on fossil fuels.
On an international level, Colombia has emerged as a leading voice in international climate diplomacy and has positioned itself as a bridge between climate-vulnerable countries and reform-minded producers. In February, Colombia joined the International Energy Agency as 33rd member country. This diplomatic stance has elevated Colombia’s profile as a norm-shaper in climate and energy governance.
As such, Colombia will host a high-profile international conference on fossil fuel phaseout this spring, co-hosted with the Netherlands in April. It will bring into even sharper focus the international political divisions that have impacted the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) process as countries grapple with the need to phase out fossil fuels while navigating intense geopolitical competition.
This conference marks a deliberate shift to take one of the most contentious climate debates outside the UNFCCC, where explicit discussion of fossil fuel phaseout has repeatedly been sidelined. At COP30, references to phasing out fossil fuels were again stripped from negotiated text, despite more than 80 countries supporting the development of a road map for phaseout. The outcome reinforced a sense that the U.N. climate process is structurally increasingly constrained on this issue. The Colombia-Netherlands initiative represents both a political workaround and a test of diplomatic resolve. The initiative was also endorsed by the Brazilian presidency at the closing plenary of COP30 (perhaps recognizing that Brazil did not achieve as much as was hoped for).
As of early 2026, a growing group of around 18 nation-states have formally endorsed and are actively pushing for the adoption of the Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation Treaty, including several Pacific island countries, Colombia, Antigua and Barbuda, Pakistan, and Cambodia, to create an economic regime and network of countries that work together, facilitating investments and technologies.
A key uncertainty is whether the United States will seek to undermine the conference, drawing on tactics already seen in 2025 such as diplomatic pressure and threats of trade repercussions against more ambitious countries.
The upcoming fossil fuel phaseout conference carries strong symbolic weight in this geopolitical moment. Against a backdrop of resurgent and confrontational oil politics marked by renewed resource nationalism, the conference needs to signal that a growing group of countries is not retreating from climate ambition under pressure.
Symbolism alone will not be sufficient. For the phaseout agenda to endure, the conference must also demonstrate how climate leadership can translate into tangible economic benefits, such as lower energy costs and new job creation. This means showcasing concrete business and investment partnerships on clean technology deployment, concessional finance, industrial policy, and just transition mechanisms.
Domestically, too, moral statements are not enough. The durability of Colombia’s stance on fossil fuels will depend both on internal political coalitions as well as the active support of the international community. This means moving beyond rhetorical praise to concrete measures: ramping up green investment through concessional finance, guaranteeing ideally tariff-free market access for low-carbon exports, and supporting fiscal transition strategies to replace hydrocarbon revenues.
A key question is how to shield climate-aligned countries from punitive trade tariffs or other financial consequences. If Colombia is left isolated, its experiment may prove to be politically unsustainable. This would send a chilling signal to other producer countries that are contemplating similar paths.
But if backed by coordinated international support, Colombia could become a proof point that climate leadership is compatible with economic stability, good governance, and sovereignty in an increasingly fractured geopolitical landscape. This landscape is shaped not only by great power competition but also by the resurgence of fossil fuel politics amid conflicts such as the escalating war in the Middle East.
