The warfare between Israel and the Islamic Republic of Iran final month didn’t produce any signal of regime change in Iran. Israel, after all, made it explicitly clear from the outset that its goal was not regime change in Iran, however that its actions might inadvertently create the circumstances for the Iranian individuals to attain this. And as Israel gained management of Iran’s skies and efficiently began to get rid of a lot of the Islamic Republic’s senior navy management and infrastructure, the assumption that this might catalyze anti-regime protests gained momentum—not least among the many Iranian opposition overseas.
Now, nonetheless, because the mud from the battle settles, policymakers, navy officers, and lots of Iranian dissidents and opposition teams are questioning why the Iranian individuals didn’t seize this supposedly distinctive second to stage an rebellion. The Islamic Republic’s propaganda equipment has, after all, capitalized on the absence of unrest, claiming that the rationale Iranians didn’t take to the streets is as a result of they’re, in truth, supportive of the regime.
The warfare between Israel and the Islamic Republic of Iran final month didn’t produce any signal of regime change in Iran. Israel, after all, made it explicitly clear from the outset that its goal was not regime change in Iran, however that its actions might inadvertently create the circumstances for the Iranian individuals to attain this. And as Israel gained management of Iran’s skies and efficiently began to get rid of a lot of the Islamic Republic’s senior navy management and infrastructure, the assumption that this might catalyze anti-regime protests gained momentum—not least among the many Iranian opposition overseas.
Now, nonetheless, because the mud from the battle settles, policymakers, navy officers, and lots of Iranian dissidents and opposition teams are questioning why the Iranian individuals didn’t seize this supposedly distinctive second to stage an rebellion. The Islamic Republic’s propaganda equipment has, after all, capitalized on the absence of unrest, claiming that the rationale Iranians didn’t take to the streets is as a result of they’re, in truth, supportive of the regime.
However that is removed from the reality. The actual cause pertains to the largely unknown safety measures that the regime preemptively activated the second that Israel’s operations began. Since 2007, the regime has invested in creating an in depth suppressive equipment throughout Iran, at each stage of society—one thing that each international powers and the Iranian opposition have utterly missed.
Whereas there’s intelligence and evaluation on the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ (IRGC) Intelligence Group and the Ministry of Intelligence and Safety (MOIS), a very powerful operational organ when it comes to implementing safety measures throughout the Iranian streets throughout instances of unrest has been utterly missed: the IRGC’s operational security-military headquarters. And since 2007, these headquarters have established a complete equipment that cuts throughout each Iranian province, metropolis, municipality, district, and even neighborhood.
Working below the IRGC’s Floor Forces—one of many group’s most important branches—there are 11 operational security-military headquarters throughout Iran. These headquarters are liable for sustaining the regime’s safety and political order in Iran’s 31 provinces.
Every of those 11 headquarters normally has about three Iranian provinces below its purview and management. Every province additionally has its personal IRGC provincial guard working below the command of the related security-military headquarters.
In 2007, the then-IRGC commander in chief, Maj. Gen. Mohammad Ali Jafari—now the top of the shadowy IRGC cultural and social headquarters—established the provincial guards to higher streamline coordination between navy and safety items in each Iranian province. This was deemed vital after the teachings that the IRGC realized from the 2003 U.S. warfare in Iraq and the quick collapse of Saddam Hussein. The idea was based mostly on the view that every province ought to have the means to guard itself throughout instances of disaster when the primary chain of command with Tehran is interrupted. These provincial guards operate like navy chiefs for his or her respective provinces, overseeing all IRGC and Basij workplaces and bases all through the realm. Every provincial guard instructions two operational wings: an infantry unit and a safety unit.
The previous is designed to guard the province from international assaults, whereas the latter is skilled to neutralize home threats within the type of protests and uprisings. Nonetheless, throughout instances of home crises akin to expansive unrest, the infantry items are included into the safety equipment, as was the case through the anti-regime protests in Iran in each 2019 and 2022.
However the safety layers of the IRGC’s operational security-military headquarters don’t merely cease on the provincial stage. They cowl each geographical layer inside every Iranian province: from cities and cities to municipal districts and even each neighborhood, by which there are items comprising each women and men. (Gender-specific items grew to become particularly necessary as girls have turn out to be extra concerned in spearheading anti-regime protests.)
This whole suppressive ecosystem was preemptively and completely operationalized as Israel’s navy operations in Iran started in mid-June. As Israel took management of Iranian airspace, the Iranian Inside Ministry’s Nationwide Safety Council (often known as “SHAK”) gave orders to the IRGC operational-security navy headquarters to neutralize any gathering that would result in protests.
Following SHAK’s orders, the 11 IRGC operational security-military headquarters and the IRGC provincial guards activated all of the layers of safety below their command construction throughout Iran, particularly in huge cities akin to Tehran.
This resulted within the quick set up of safety checkpoints at every municipality’s regional zones, districts, and neighborhoods—together with in rural areas— throughout all Iranian provinces, together with the cities of Tehran, Shiraz, and Esfahan. These checkpoints had been designed to allow stop-and-search operations towards Iranian pedestrians and automobiles. Such measures concerned the confiscation of civilian telephones with out warrants to seek for any anti-regime or pro-Israel content material, together with any materials mocking the Islamic Republic. Autos had been additionally looked for “delicate” dual-use gadgets that would undermine the safety equipment, akin to drones and communication tools.
Along with such measures, roadblocks manned by Basij items armed with batons had been deployed throughout all most important highways and squares all through the municipality areas and districts by the IRGC-Basij Regional Workplace and Basij district workplaces. Armed Basij patrols had been additionally operationalized throughout all most important roads and intersections. Likewise, as reviews started to flow into of Iranians taking to their rooftops to chant anti-regime slogans—akin to “loss of life to the dictator”—the neighborhood workplaces deployed their female and male teams to hold out avenue patrols throughout totally different neighborhoods to determine the condominium blocks finishing up such exercise.
Past bodily operations, the 11 IRGC operational security-military headquarters additionally took in depth measures focusing on the Iranian individuals’s means to speak. As Israeli strikes started, the Iran’s national-security our bodies gave orders to first scale back of the web considerably after which later imposed a full blackout for greater than three days. (Web pace within the nation stays considerably lowered and restricted, regardless that the battle has ended.)
In adopting such preemptive actions, the objectives of the IRGC’s operational security-military headquarters had been threefold. First, to evoke worry and intimidation by making a deeply securitized atmosphere and environment. Second, to show to the inhabitants that the regime nonetheless maintains the streets and is accountable for the political order.
Lastly, and maybe most significantly, the preemptive growth of this in depth safety internet is geared towards stopping and neutralizing the preliminary nucleus (hasteh-e avaliyeh in Farsi) of any potential gathering that would spiral uncontrolled and catalyze uncontrollable protests.
These measures paid dividends for the Islamic Republic. In simply 12 days, nearly 1000 civilians had been arbitrarily detained below the imprecise notion of “supporting” Israel. This consists of those that had been stopped-and-searched at checkpoints and located to have content material on their cellphones that was deemed to be “supporting Israeli assaults” or mocking the Islamic Republic. The regime has even already executed an unclear variety of present detainees on trumped up expenses.
Maybe extra importantly, the extremely securitized and intrusive atmosphere that these measures had been capable of foster, coupled with Israel’s strikes, resulted in Iranians both staying indoors or emptying the primary cities as an alternative of taking to the streets.
It was not till the ultimate few days of the warfare that Israel turned its consideration to focusing on the IRGC’s operational security-military headquarters and provincial forces. For instance, the Karbala headquarters—which controls the safety of Khuzestan, Kohgiluyeh and Boyer Ahmad, and Lorestan—was struck. Likewise, the Provincial Guard for Alborz province, the IRGC Imam Hassan Mojtaba Corps, was additionally focused.
Nonetheless, whereas Israel’s strikes successfully dismantled a lot of the IRGC’s navy and nuclear infrastructure, they solely touched the tip of the iceberg in relation to its in depth suppressive equipment. The principle artery preserving the regime’s home safety was left comparatively unscathed. In different phrases, regardless of Israel controlling the skies, the regime’s safety forces nonetheless dominated the streets, leaving no house for the Iranian individuals to protest.
Except the IRGC’s in depth safety internet—which permeates each stage of Iranian society and provincial construction—is dismantled or a minimum of considerably weakened, large-scale anti-regime protests are unlikely to take root, regardless of widespread public discontent. This equipment has been probably the most important barrier to vary in Iran over the previous 46 years.
