In what has been extensively hailed as a breakthrough, U.S. President Donald Trump hosted the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan on the White Home on Aug. 8 for what was termed a “peace summit.” The ceremonial summit featured separate bilateral conferences between Trump and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan in addition to Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev after which moved on to the primary occasion—the signing of a “joint declaration” by all three.
The precise outcomes of this assembly have been each greater than anticipated and fewer than they appeared. The summit provided two sensible outcomes: the initialing of a bilateral peace treaty by the Armenian and Azerbaijani overseas ministers and the signing by the three presidents of a preliminary doc on the institution of a “connectivity undertaking.”
The signing of a declaration on street and rail connections, each supported and signed by Trump, mirrored an settlement that broke by means of a number of years of problematic negotiations between the 2 sides. However on the identical time, the Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders did not finalize the signing of the bilateral peace treaty. Deferring the signing of the treaty, the 2 leaders as a substitute had their overseas ministers “preliminary” the doc, with a later signing to come back solely when Armenia meets situations imposed by Azerbaijan.
Welcome because the treaty is, it additionally does little to deal with the foundation causes of their long-standing battle.
The primary doc, a bilateral Armenian-Azerbaijani peace treaty, was truly prepared to be signed again in March, when almost 10 rounds of negotiations culminated to assist hammer out a 17-point settlement. Now, the draft treaty has been formally initialed by the 2 overseas ministers. However Azerbaijan stays adamant that the ultimate signing is conditional on additional Armenian concessions, most notably centering on Baku’s demand that Armenia should amend its structure to take away any reference to the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh area.
Nonetheless, each the conclusion of the negotiations over the textual content and the initialing of the treaty signify an essential transfer nearer to peace. And simply as each postwar peace treaty wanting whole give up fails to totally fulfill both aspect, this Armenian-Azerbaijani settlement affords every occasion a mixture of diplomatic retreat and political reward.
For Azerbaijan, navy victory within the 2020 Karabakh conflict enabled it to impose phrases on a weakened Armenia—and so the treaty treats the territorial dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh as a finished deal. That is essentially the most controversial level, because the Karabakh battle truly predates the independence of each nations, erupting in the course of the waning days of the Soviet Union and sparking a damaging conflict within the Nineteen Nineties that Armenia gained.
Notably, the treaty makes no point out of the 100,000 Armenians who have been forcibly expelled from Nagorno-Karabakh after Azerbaijan’s victory. As a substitute, it commits each events to reject any “separatism” or “violent extremism” and dictates that Armenia will chorus from any authorized problem over Nagorno-Karabakh’s standing.
On the identical time, it accommodates no point out of the 2 dozen or extra Armenian prisoners of conflict and detainees now in Azerbaijani custody. Arrested on doubtful fees and below questionable authorized standing, this group of prisoners contains a number of former democratically elected leaders of Nagorno-Karabakh, whose destiny is now much more unsure.
As a preconditions for signing a long-lasting peace treaty, Azerbaijan has additionally required Armenia to surrender the mandate of the Group for Safety and Cooperation in Europe’s Minsk Group, which was beforehand empowered to mediate the Nagorno-Karabakh battle.
Armenia, whose diplomatic technique is predicated on a recognition of its personal weak spot, has accepted the necessity to compromise. In return, nonetheless, the treaty affords two important achievements for the Armenian aspect. First, Azerbaijan has now acknowledged Armenia’s present borders and dropped its irredentist claims on Armenian territory, together with inflammatory statements labeling Armenian territory as “western Azerbaijan.” This can assist in ongoing border delineation and demarcation talks, which have nearly stalled since early 2025.
A second essential part of the treaty for Armenia is the mutual promise to “fight intolerance” and chorus from the “menace of use of pressure.” Extra constructive parts embrace an announcement {that a} bilateral fee will probably be empowered to supervise the implementation of the phrases of the treaty, a reference to the necessity for “mutually agreed safety and confidence-building measures,” and the deliberate institution of diplomatic relations.
Regardless of this progress, nonetheless, uncertainty stays about how the treaty phrases will probably be carried out. With no worldwide assure and no worldwide guarantor, there’s far too little funding in guaranteeing a long-lasting and sturdy peace. Even Trump’s internet hosting of the ceremony did little to assuage these issues. Tellingly, the U.S. president merely signed as a “witness” to the Armenian-Azerbaijani declaration.
This uncertainty is especially harmful for a peace treaty that’s primarily based on a premise of rewarding and recognizing the outcomes of the usage of pressure by Azerbaijan. No matter guarantees Azerbaijan makes, the treaty creates a precedent that validates Baku’s aggression—each throughout its choice to wage conflict in 2020 in addition to in its 2023 seizure of Nagorno-Karabakh and expulsion of the Armenian inhabitants—and endorses a win for an authoritarian state over a struggling democracy.
Alongside the bilateral peace treaty, the Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders signed a separate doc regarding transport “connectivity,” with a concentrate on new street and rail tasks. Additionally signed by Trump, this joint declaration dedicated the 2 sides to a framework for the creation of a “Trump Route for Worldwide Peace and Prosperity” (TRIPP).
Regardless of the grandiose title, the TRIPP settlement affords an essential incentive for postwar peace and stability. The emphasis on post-conflict connectivity additionally offers a much-needed opening and alternative for overcoming the financial constraints of the isolation of Armenia, which has suffered from the long-standing closure of its borders with Turkey and Azerbaijan for the reason that early Nineteen Nineties.
The TRIPP settlement affords each an endorsement of Armenian sovereignty and clear assist for territorial integrity. That is an particularly essential level given Azerbaijan’s earlier maximalist demand for an extraterritorial “hall” by means of Armenia. The TRIPP framework repudiates any reference to such a hall, as a substitute making a street and rail connection below full and unquestioned Armenian sovereign management.
A second essential breakthrough for Armenia stems from the reciprocal nature of the undertaking. The street and rail hyperlinks will contain greater than merely Azerbaijani entry, additionally offering Armenia with a vital route to beat its relative isolation. Over the long term, Armenia’s reciprocal use can even encourage higher commerce and elevated exports and imports from extra distant markets whereas additional lessening Armenian overdependence on Russia.
On the identical time, the TRIPP undertaking grants Azerbaijan its long-desired direct connection to its exclave of Nakhchivan. That is essential to Baku not solely to beat its prior dependence on Iranian territory and airspace to entry the exclave, but in addition to meet its broader strategic need to function a gateway to Central Asia.
Notably, the settlement additionally requires involvement within the TRIPP undertaking from “third events,” particularly from U.S. non-public pursuits. The funding from U.S. companies conforms to the Trump administration’s business-orientated method to brokering peace within the area in addition to Trump’s private curiosity in a “actual property” deal for Armenia and Azerbaijan. Such U.S. engagement additionally additional sidelines each Russia and Iran, difficult many years of Russian dominance and thwarting Iranian hopes for exerting regional affect.
Regardless of this, Moscow has been uncharacteristically passive and even unusually supportive in its response to the TRIPP undertaking, seemingly perceiving extra alternative than menace. Russia is now hoping to revive its misplaced energy and affect within the area after it failed to ensure Armenia’s safety. TRIPP creates the chance for Moscow to rebuild its presence, not by means of a return to exhausting energy however by means of leveraging its personal function in managing regional street and rail transport. Even when the TRIPP undertaking progresses as deliberate, Russia can nonetheless exert its affect by means of Armenia’s membership within the Moscow-dominated Eurasian Financial Union and by advantage of the truth that Russia operates the Armenian railway community.
Turkey, too, hopes to learn from the association. For Ankara, these agreements present long-awaited political cowl to normalize relations with Armenia, with much less danger of angering Azerbaijan. This additionally paves the best way for Turkey to regain its regional function within the South Caucasus, particularly as Russia stays distracted and overwhelmed by its failed invasion of Ukraine. Turkey’s direct navy assist for Azerbaijan within the 2020 conflict failed to provide the outcomes that Ankara had hoped for, because it was denied a promised postwar peacekeeping presence in Azerbaijan and was excluded from the trilateral Armenian-Azerbaijani-Russian working group empowered to barter the restoration of commerce and transport.
But all of the potential advantages of the 2 agreements hinge on long-term engagement within the area, and right here, critical questions exist. The South Caucasus has by no means been seen as a direct U.S. nationwide curiosity. Consequently, it’s usually subsumed below broader issues about U.S.-Russian relations in addition to U.S coverage towards Turkey, Iran, and even Central Asia.
Trump’s method raises additional issues. The U.S. administration’s involvement within the early August talks was directed by the president himself by means of the White Home, with little involvement from both the State Division or the Nationwide Safety Council and even much less preparation or research within the formulation of this coverage initiative. Now, with U.S. company pursuits supposedly taking the lead within the TRIPP undertaking, there’s an elevated chance that U.S. engagement may flag if earnings don’t observe.
But regardless of such issues, the breakthrough in talks is plain. The query is whether or not it is usually unsustainable. Extra work is required to make sure a long-lasting however restricted so-called peace, outlined extra by the absence of open hostilities than by real reconciliation. The settlement on connectivity could just do that by creating a level of financial interdependence that may function a deterrent to future conflict and restore regional safety.
