Amid ongoing negotiations between Washington and Tehran, U.S. President Donald Trump is reportedly demanding that Iran abandon its commitment to uranium enrichment, possibly for at least 12 years.
Critics, however, like former U.S. President Joe Biden’s national security advisor, Jake Sullivan, have argued that Washington’s insistence on non-enrichment will ultimately undermine diplomacy. He said last month, “I do not think there can be a deal if the United States holds to the line that Iran has to completely surrender in perpetuity its right and capacity to enrich uranium.”
Amid ongoing negotiations between Washington and Tehran, U.S. President Donald Trump is reportedly demanding that Iran abandon its commitment to uranium enrichment, possibly for at least 12 years.
Critics, however, like former U.S. President Joe Biden’s national security advisor, Jake Sullivan, have argued that Washington’s insistence on non-enrichment will ultimately undermine diplomacy. He said last month, “I do not think there can be a deal if the United States holds to the line that Iran has to completely surrender in perpetuity its right and capacity to enrich uranium.”
But Iran does not have a right to enrich uranium. In fact, Trump is right to expect Tehran to abandon its enrichment program forever.
To understand why, consider the science. Uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing (sometimes referred to as ENR) are dual-use technologies. The process used to make fuel for a nuclear reactor can also be used to make fuel for a nuclear bomb. Once a country can enrich uranium (or reprocess plutonium), therefore, it also has the key capacity to become a nuclear-armed state.
Scientists and policymakers have understood this problem since the dawn of the nuclear age and devised a simple solution: fuel-cycle services. Countries do not need to make their own nuclear fuel. If they want a truly peaceful nuclear program (for energy, research, or medical purposes), then they can have fuel provided to them by more advanced nuclear powers, like France, Russia, or the United States. The recipient runs the fuel in their reactors and sends back the spent fuel in return for the next shipment.
There are dozens of countries in the world today, such as Sweden, Mexico, and Vietnam, that have peaceful nuclear programs but that do not enrich uranium or reprocess plutonium.
U.S. nuclear energy and nonproliferation policy since President Dwight Eisenhower has been clear and consistent on this principle. In the Atoms for Peace program, the Eisenhower administration helped many countries, including Iran, with research reactors and basic nuclear science but refused to export ENR capabilities.
The 1974 Nuclear Suppliers Group (an institution of the nonproliferation regime with 48 nation-state members) came together to place strict export controls on the spread of sensitive ENR technologies to additional countries in order to stop the spread of nuclear weapons.
This is a one-size-fits-all policy that Washington has imposed on friends and enemies alike. When U.S. allies and partners South Korea and Taiwan pursued clandestine plutonium reprocessing programs in the 1970s and 1980s, for example, Washington came down on them hard and forced them to shut down the programs.
Washington’s efforts to curtail the spread of ENR have not always worked. Some countries, like North Korea and Pakistan, managed to develop sensitive fuel-cycle facilities (and build nuclear weapons) despite Washington’s opposition. But these are cases of Washington trying and failing to enforce its noble standards, not examples to be emulated.
When it was revealed in 2002 that Iran had a secret enrichment program, therefore, Washington’s response was obvious and automatic: Tehran would need to stop enriching uranium. This was the position of both President George W. Bush and President Barack Obama. Obama promised on the campaign trail that he would “stop Iran’s uranium enrichment program.” The U.N. Security Council passed six resolutions from 2006 to 2010 demanding that Iran suspend uranium enrichment.
Tehran objected, claiming it has a “right to enrich.” This argument is now being repeated by Tehran and others in the West, but it is nonsense.
Iran bases its so-called right on Article IV of the 1970 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, more commonly known as the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty or the NPT—a treaty to which Iran is a signatory. But the NPT never once mentions uranium enrichment.
Instead, Article IV states:
Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.
So, does Article IV give Iran the right to enrich?
Like almost all of international law, it is ambiguous. The “use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes” is never clearly defined in the NPT or elsewhere.
Moreover, like other international law, there is no world government or world court to pass, enforce, or adjudicate international law. Rather, it is up to nation-states to interpret and adjudicate international law themselves, and Washington and Tehran have a different interpretation of the NPT.
Tehran argues that Article IV grants it “the inalienable right” to enrich uranium “for peaceful purposes without discrimination.”
The United States and much of the international community’s position has been that ENR can be used to make fuel for nuclear weapons and, therefore, does not clearly qualify as a “peaceful purpose” under the NPT. Indeed, in recognition of this danger, the abovementioned Nuclear Suppliers Group was created to support the NPT and stop the spread of ENR.
Moreover, Article IV states that the peaceful use of nuclear energy must be “in conformity with” Article I. Article I bans nonnuclear weapon states—such as Iran—from building nuclear weapons. But most observers rightly suspect that Iran’s enrichment program is a cover for a bomb program. After all, the International Atomic Energy Agency has found that Iran had a dedicated nuclear weapons program in the past, and the design of Iran’s nuclear program today is not consistent with a country that only wants energy.
After all, if Iran truly wanted a peaceful program, the solution would be simple: It could shut down its enrichment program and receive international fuel-cycle services—like the dozens of other countries noted above with a similar arrangement. The international community has offered Iran fuel-cycle services many times over the decades, but Iran has always insisted on enriching uranium itself.
Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner reportedly offered Iran fuel-cycle services again in February, just days before the return to war. Critics at the time argued that Witkoff and Kushner were out of their depth because they didn’t appreciate Iran’s nuanced, technical counteroffer about types and levels of Iranian domestic enrichment. But those details did not matter. The U.S. negotiators were right to reject out of hand any offer that allowed Iran to enrich.
In a desperate attempt to get a deal, the Obama administration caved on the United States’ zero-enrichment standard in the 2015 Iran nuclear deal—also known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). This was a mistake. The deal allowed Iran to continue to enrich uranium with limits. But after 15 years, the limits were set to expire. At that point, Iran would have been able to enrich as much weapons-grade uranium as it wanted consistent with the terms of the deal. Even Obama admitted that after the limits expired, the time it could take Iran to dash to a bomb would shrink “almost down to zero.”
Moreover, the JCPOA set a dangerous precedent. U.S. allies and partners, like Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and South Korea, could ask, “If Iran can make nuclear fuel, why can’t we?”
Trump was right, therefore, to pull out of the JCPOA in 2018, and he is right to push for zero enrichment in the current negotiations with Iran. In fact, if anything, Trump’s position may be too lenient. Recent reports suggest that he is demanding that Iran stop enriching uranium for only 12-15 years. A deal that allows Iran to resume enrichment would mean once again kicking the can down the road and creating problems for future presidents.
Instead, Trump should reject Iran’s phony claims of a right to enrich and strike a binding deal that suspends Iran’s enrichment program in perpetuity. This may be the best way to finally resolve the Iranian nuclear challenge once and for all.
