It is a special kind of folly to make long-term predictions amid the fog of war. Nobody knows how Operation Epic Fury will end. But there are already a few things we can celebrate and condemn.
On the celebration side: The professionalism and courage of the American military stand out. So does the just demise of Ayatollah Khamenei, amid scores of his murderous henchmen. Other things worth celebrating are merely possibilities at this point. If the nearly half-century of Iranian repression at home and terrorism abroad is poised to end, along with Iran’s nuclear ambitions, that would be cause for monumental celebration. And whether you celebrate it or not, it would be a massive addition to Donald Trump’s presidential legacy.
On the other hand: This is no way for a constitutional republic to go to war. The ever-changing rationales, the failure to consult Congress, and Congress’ refusal to demand consultation and authorization, is an outrage no matter how this war ends. If the war and its aftermath are deemed successful, there will still be a price to pay as our system of checks and balances will seem to future presidents as even more of a dead letter. Conversely, if this ends in disaster, one could see a renewed effort to restore that system to prevent such calamities in the future.
Everything unfolding in and above Iran depends on the consequences, intended and unintended, of one man’s unilateral decision to launch a war. In short, we’re all on blowback watch.
Opponents of toppling the mullahcracy have relied on no argument more than the specter of blowback. This is the always reasonable concern that the unintended consequences of an action will be worse than taking no action at all. The term originated in 1950s-era CIA, but the idea goes back at least to Thucydides. As former CIA analyst Chalmers Johnson wrote in his 2000 book “Blowback”: “Even an empire cannot control the long-term effects of its policies. That is the essence of blowback.”
Cultivating fear of blowback has been the organizing principle of Iranian national security for decades. It built an “Axis of Resistance” — Hezbollah, Hamas, a pliant vassal regime in Syria, etc. — to make the price of attacking Iran too steep to contemplate. That was the primary motive for an Iranian nuclear program.
What the ayatollahs, and their political and intellectual praetorians in the West, didn’t appreciate is that the concept of blowback isn’t just a check on American or Western power. It’s a universal phenomenon (just ask Russian President Vladimir Putin).
Consider that Operation Epic Fury is largely the direct consequence of the heinous Oct. 7, 2023 attacks led by Iran’s proxy Hamas. The blowback from 10/7 led to the pulverizing not just of Hamas, but of Hezbollah, and indirectly the fall of the Assad regime in Syria. It also led to the degradation of Iran’s own defenses to the point where Operation Epic Fury became feasible.
It remains to be seen whether the operation will be successful. Regime change from the air is hard. Regime change from the air that doesn’t lead to chaos on the ground — as with Libya in 2011 — is far harder.
The potential this all could go sideways is not a particularly adroit or novel insight. Such warnings, largely from Trump’s critics, are a staple of every op-ed page and cable news discussion.
What has been less discussed is whether Trump subscribes to blowback theory. It’s easy to miss as the bombs drop, but Trump’s whole approach to military action is for quick “wins” with few lasting entanglements. That’s why he is already talking about “off-ramps” and restarting negotiations with Iran (It’s also partly why he didn’t actually change the regime in Venezuela. He merely replaced an incalcitrant autocratic thug with a pliable one).
Right now, it’s reasonable to worry about the blowback from unilaterally launching a war against Iran. But if things get too messy for him, specifically if Iran’s strategy of roiling the whole region, disrupting the flow of oil and panicking financial markets, succeeds, the debate could shift suddenly. Instead of the charge that he was too reckless in taking bold action, the criticism could switch to how he got cold feet before finishing the job, leaving the whole region in turmoil.
Trump may seem like a hypocrite to many detractors for violating countless promises to end “forever wars,” but a forever war remains the last thing he actually wants. That doesn’t mean he won’t get one. Because Trump cannot control the long-term effects of his policies.
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Ideas expressed in the piece
The military professionalism and courage demonstrated by American forces merits celebration, as does the death of Ayatollah Khamenei and associated regime leaders, with potential elimination of Iran’s nuclear ambitions and decades of regional terrorism representing a significant addition to Trump’s presidential legacy.
The decision to launch military operations represents a departure from constitutional procedures, with the lack of Congressional consultation and authorization constituting an outrage that will have lasting institutional consequences regardless of whether the operation succeeds or fails. If successful, future presidents will view checks and balances as further weakened; if unsuccessful, efforts to restore constitutional constraints may intensify.
Blowback—the concept that unintended consequences of military action may prove worse than inaction—represents a legitimate concern that applies universally rather than exclusively to American power. The operation itself resulted partly from blowback following Hamas attacks in October 2023, demonstrating how consequences cascade unpredictably across regions and actors.
Trump’s approach prioritizes quick military “wins” with minimal lasting entanglements, with the administration already discussing “off-ramps” and potential negotiations restart. This preference for rapid conclusions rather than extended commitments distinguishes the administration’s strategy, though it carries risks of either appearing too aggressive early or insufficiently committed later.
Criticism of the operation could shift from accusations of recklessness to charges of abandoning the effort prematurely if regional instability worsens, oil supplies face disruption, or financial markets destabilize. Trump cannot ultimately control the long-term effects of military policies regardless of initial intentions.
Different views on the topic
Public support for Operation Epic Fury remains uncertain and limited, with polling showing Americans closely divided or favoring skepticism toward the operation. A YouGov poll found 45 percent believed Trump made the wrong decision compared to 31 percent supporting the action, while a Reuters/Ipsos poll showed only 27 percent approving operations against 43 percent disapproving, with 56 percent agreeing Trump is too willing to use military force[2]. Approximately 25 percent of Americans remain undecided, and only 18 percent favor continuing operations regardless of gas price impacts[2], suggesting limited public appetite for prolonged engagement.
Significant nuclear proliferation risks persist despite the military strikes. Operation Epic Fury may have reduced short-term proliferation threats but introduces new risks, including uncertainty regarding the location of Iran’s 400-kilogram stockpile of 60 percent enriched uranium and the potential for scattered nuclear and missile scientists to pose proliferation dangers to non-state actors or foreign nations if Iranian institutions collapse[1]. Any strikes against the Bushehr reactor could create radiological and diplomatic hazards despite Russian personnel remaining on-site[1].
The conflict demonstrates potential for escalation beyond initial military objectives. Iranian retaliation designated Operation True Promise 4 already targeted U.S. military installations across the Middle East, with both Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates signaling willingness to respond directly rather than simply intercepting Iranian salvos[1]. Future Iranian responses will likely involve cyber operations and terrorist attacks, with Iranian internet connectivity already down 46 percent, suggesting large-scale cyber operations are underway[1]. The systematic nature of current strikes makes de-escalation options that characterized previous U.S.-Iran military exchanges increasingly difficult to envision[1].
Regime change through airstrikes without subsequent ground operations carries substantial risks of prolonged instability comparable to the Libya intervention in 2011, where aerial operations failed to prevent regional chaos and lasting conflict.
