Nuclear Latency Might Be Strategic for U.S.

U.S. President Donald Trump made headlines final October when he introduced he had given South Korea approval to construct nuclear-powered submarines. It’s unclear whether or not america will provide the nuclear gasoline or allow South Korea to counterpoint its personal, however the latter choice would successfully give South Korea the technical capability to supply nuclear weapons shortly—inside a matter of months—if it so chooses, a situation often called nuclear latency.

To do that, Trump would theoretically want Congress to revise the bilateral U.S.-Korea nuclear cooperation settlement, often called the 123 Settlement. Final up to date in 2015, this settlement permits South Korea to counterpoint uranium as much as 20 p.c and pursue pyroprocessing for civilian functions with U.S. consent. Nevertheless, it explicitly prohibits enriching or reprocessing U.S.-origin nuclear supplies for army use, a class that features gasoline for nuclear-powered submarines.

U.S. President Donald Trump made headlines final October when he introduced he had given South Korea approval to construct nuclear-powered submarines. It’s unclear whether or not america will provide the nuclear gasoline or allow South Korea to counterpoint its personal, however the latter choice would successfully give South Korea the technical capability to supply nuclear weapons shortly—inside a matter of months—if it so chooses, a situation often called nuclear latency.

To do that, Trump would theoretically want Congress to revise the bilateral U.S.-Korea nuclear cooperation settlement, often called the 123 Settlement. Final up to date in 2015, this settlement permits South Korea to counterpoint uranium as much as 20 p.c and pursue pyroprocessing for civilian functions with U.S. consent. Nevertheless, it explicitly prohibits enriching or reprocessing U.S.-origin nuclear supplies for army use, a class that features gasoline for nuclear-powered submarines.

However two weeks after Trump’s preliminary announcement, the White Home launched a truth sheet that laid out a method to bypass Congress altogether. “In step with the bilateral 123 Settlement and topic to U.S. authorized necessities,” it mentioned, “america helps the method that may result in the [Republic of Korea’s] civil uranium enrichment and spent gasoline reprocessing for peaceable makes use of.” Not like authorizing nuclear-powered submarines, granting South Korea consent for creating these applied sciences for civilian functions faces no fast authorized obstacles and doesn’t require Congressional approval.

Although loads of uncertainties stay, if the Trump administration continues down this path, it will pave the best way for South Korea’s nuclear latency. The important thing query, then, is whether or not Washington ought to assist this improvement. Nevertheless provocative this will likely sound, my reply is “sure”—not as a result of nuclear latency comes with out danger, however as a result of all of the options could also be even worse for U.S. pursuits.

Though South Korea’s acquisition of enrichment or reprocessing know-how wouldn’t, in itself, violate the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), these capabilities are inherently proliferation-prone. They permit a state to supply fissile materials, which is essentially the most technically demanding step in constructing a nuclear weapon. As soon as mastered, such capabilities dramatically shorten the timeline and decrease the political and financial prices of nuclear armament.

Because of this, Washington has lengthy restricted recipients of its civilian nuclear help from pursuing enrichment and reprocessing applied sciences with out express U.S. consent. This reluctance stems from the potential detrimental penalties for the worldwide nonproliferation regime. If South Korea acquires these capabilities, different international locations, equivalent to Saudi Arabia and Turkey, might search to do the identical, and U.S. efforts to forestall their pursuit would inevitably provoke accusations of double requirements. The broader diffusion of nuclear latency would, in flip, make the worldwide safety surroundings considerably extra fragile.

These considerations are official. However america’ options are fraught as effectively.

1. Keep the Standing Quo

The present method—counting on prolonged deterrence whereas proscribing South Korea’s nuclear choices—is more and more untenable. South Koreans proceed to query the credibility of U.S. safety ensures, and public assist for nuclear armament stays excessive. Even after the 2023 Washington Declaration and the launch of the Nuclear Consultative Group, which demonstrated sturdy U.S. dedication to defending South Korea, assist for an indigenous arsenal dipped solely briefly earlier than rebounding to almost 73 p.c by early 2024—and rising to greater than 76 p.c after Trump returned to workplace final 12 months.

This means that it doesn’t matter what america does to bolster its deterrence, it might not be adequate to handle South Korea’s enduring skepticism over whether or not america would really danger New York, Los Angeles, or Chicago to defend Seoul. That concern is changing into extra acute as North Korea strikes nearer to possessing a dependable functionality to strike the U.S. homeland. As soon as North Korea can credibly threaten U.S. cities, the prices and dangers of defending South Korea may turn into too excessive for america.

Towards this backdrop, Washington’s mantra of strengthening “the credibility of the U.S. prolonged deterrence dedication” is unlikely to assuage South Korea’s sense of insecurity.

2. Deploy Tactical Nuclear Weapons to South Korea

 This feature gives minimal strategic profit. Though some in Seoul assist the concept, redeploying U.S. tactical nuclear weapons can be unlikely to handle South Korea’s underlying strategic considerations. Whereas such a transfer would possibly create the looks of a stronger U.S. dedication, it will stay squarely throughout the conventional framework of prolonged deterrence, with Washington retaining full operational management.

Given the proximity of the 2 Koreas, Seoul would virtually definitely push for shared and even pre-delegated launch authority to account for compressed resolution timelines—situations by which a response is required inside minutes, somewhat than hours. Washington, nevertheless, is very unlikely to simply accept such an association. In consequence, South Korea would stay depending on U.S. decision-making for nuclear use, perpetuating the very vulnerability that drives its curiosity in nuclear autonomy.

Redeployment dangers creating the worst of each worlds: South Korea would turn into extra weak, significantly for North Korean or Chinese language strikes on nuclear storage amenities, whereas nonetheless missing autonomous management over nuclear weapons.

On the identical time, this selection would impose substantial prices on america, each on the subject of the logistical and monetary burden of nuclear weapon storage and the authorized considerations this could elevate underneath Article I of the NPT, which prohibits nuclear-weapon states from transferring nuclear weapons to non-nuclear weapon states.

3. Assist or Abandon a Nuclear South Korea

If Washington fails to handle Seoul’s safety considerations, South Korea might select to develop its personal nuclear arsenal. As soon as thought-about unthinkable, this selection may turn into unavoidable if the perceived prices of missing an unbiased deterrent start to exceed the prices of buying one. The USA would then face an unenviable selection: assist (or quietly condone) South Korea’s nuclearization, or sever the alliance. Neither consequence would serve U.S. pursuits.

Supporting a nuclear-armed South Korea would significantly undermine the worldwide nonproliferation regime. Although the regime has arguably weathered North Korea’s and Iran’s nuclear ambitions to date, the harm brought on by a law-abiding member brazenly pursuing nuclear weapons—with a minimum of tacit U.S. assist—could be much more profound. If the principal architect and guarantor of the nonproliferation regime had been seen as enabling such a transfer, the whole system’s credibility could be gravely, maybe irreparably, broken. The following collapse of this multilateral framework would virtually definitely speed up the unfold of nuclear weapons globally.

Then again, distancing from or abandoning a nuclear South Korea would impose monumental prices on america. Shedding a trusted ally with substantial army, financial, technological, and industrial capabilities would considerably weaken its strategic footing in a crucial area. As U.S. Forces Korea Commander Gen. Xavier Brunson just lately famous, the Korean Peninsula’s geostrategic location offers cost-imposition capabilities in opposition to each Russian and Chinese language forces, making the U.S. army presence there a supply of “important strategic benefit.”

Towards these options, allowing South Korea to take care of nuclear latency gives Washington a number of benefits.

First, nuclear latency may improve stability on the Korean Peninsula by mitigating South Korea’s safety fears and by decreasing North Korea’s incentives for restricted standard or tactical nuclear assaults. The credible prospect that South Korea may assemble nuclear weapons inside months and retaliate would diminish the attraction of aggression except North Korea may confidently destroy the whole latent South Korean arsenal—unlikely given its weak intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities—or is keen to danger an all-out battle.

Nuclear latency would additionally give South Korea leverage in future risk-reduction talks with North Korea, which has lengthy dismissed South Korean overtures. Counterintuitive as it might appear, a managed diploma of nuclear latency may contribute larger inter-Korean stability.

Second, supporting South Korea’s nuclear latency may strengthen america’ broader Indo-Pacific technique. Acknowledging its ally’s safety considerations would sign belief and respect, reinforcing cohesion throughout the relationship. And in sensible phrases, preserving U.S. political assist for South Korea’s pursuit of nuclear-powered submarines possible requires framing them as serving a regional safety function past deterring North Korea, since some argue diesel-electric submarines might suffice for peninsula-focused missions. Solid as contribution to regional burden-sharing, this program, as soon as operational, would ease strain on U.S. submarine manufacturing capability whereas strengthening deterrence in opposition to China.

Lastly, South Korea’s improvement of enrichment capabilities would assist dilute Russia’s and China’s dominance of the worldwide nuclear gasoline market. Collectively, Russia and China at the moment provide greater than 60 p.c of the world’s low-enriched uranium (LEU) and virtually all high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU), important for next-generation reactors. The USA is stepping up efforts to develop its personal nuclear gasoline manufacturing, however permitting South Korea to supply LEU and HALEU at scale would additional bolster vitality safety for america and its companions.

Not one of the decisions dealing with Washington are with out danger. However the query is just not whether or not supporting South Korea’s nuclear latency is good. It’s whether or not the options—South Korean nuclear armament and dropping South Korea as an ally—could be higher. They might not.

Permitting South Korea to develop managed nuclear latency underneath strict safeguards and efficient oversight could be the most tolerable choice: one which strengthens deterrence, preserves the alliance, helps U.S. technique in Asia, and nonetheless provides Washington time to handle any potential South Korean breakout earlier than it happens.

In a world of imperfect choices, the least dangerous selection can also be essentially the most prudent one.

This text is tailored from The whole lot however the Bomb: South Korea’s Nuclear Hedging Technique, forthcoming from Stanford College Press.