In January, Ugandans will head to the polls—formally to elect their president however in actuality to substantiate the inevitable. Yoweri Museveni, who has dominated since 1986, will win once more. This can mark his ninth time period in energy.
The election, in different phrases, is merely a backdrop. The actual query now shouldn’t be whether or not Museveni will win however what comes after the 81-year-old dictator exits the stage. Along with his son consolidating energy, inside maneuvering throughout the ruling occasion will in the end decide who succeeds Museveni. However no matter type that transition takes, it stays to be seen whether or not the regime can include the social forces it has lengthy tried to handle by repression and patronage.
Recollections of the run-up to Uganda’s 2021 elections stay recent. In November 2020, not less than 54 folks had been killed throughout protests following the arrest of opposition chief Robert Kyagulanyi, higher often called Bobi Wine. The federal government itself acknowledged detaining greater than 1,300 folks in reference to the elections. Impartial investigations documented what number of had been kidnapped and tortured, most easily for being related to the opposition Nationwide Unity Platform (NUP). The message of all this was clear: Dissent carries insufferable prices.
Early indicators pointed to the identical trajectory once more this 12 months. In March, a by-election in Kampala’s Kawempe North constituency turned violent, with masked safety assaulting journalists and voters. Across the similar time, safety businesses raided the NUP headquarters in Kampala quite a few occasions. The message once more appeared clear—elections had been going to be handled as a army train.
Then, to the shock of many, the violence didn’t develop. This was not an ethical awakening however a strategic adjustment. Within the Kawempe election, the ruling Nationwide Resistance Motion (NRM) candidate, Nambi Faridah, misplaced badly. She blamed her loss on the heavy-handed safety response, claiming that it had handed the opposition a “sympathy vote.” A variety of stories recommend that this prompted a quiet choice to keep away from the identical spectacle nationally.
However this restraint by no means meant that violence had vanished. If something, the risk remained omnipresent. Muhoozi Kainerugaba, Museveni’s son and the top of the military, has this 12 months gone on quite a few X storms, threatening to behead opposition leaders and remodel the military right into a “Killing Machine.”
And since the sooner quiet was tactical, it eroded shortly as soon as the marketing campaign heated up. In late October, arrests resumed on the marketing campaign path in northern Uganda. Ten NUP members had been detained and brought to courtroom, whereas two senior NUP leaders fled the nation, citing threats to their lives. In early November, NUP groups arriving in two districts had been confronted by teams in yellow NRM T-shirts armed with sticks, resulting in clashes and arrests. At the least 95 NUP members had been subsequently charged with minor offenses equivalent to site visitors violations or obstruction of police. Since then, the crackdown has continued with additional arrests on the marketing campaign path.
These developments signaled a full return to acquainted techniques. Two Kenyan activists disappeared for 38 days earlier than resurfacing; Museveni later argued that he had put them within the “fridge.” Days earlier, he warned that any try to protest—just like the lethal November 2020 demonstrations—would “find yourself badly.” And following a well-worn script, he cautioned international powers towards meddling in Ugandan affairs, singling out Europeans.
Behind this sample of repression lies concern over Uganda’s “ghetto youth”—a constituency the regime views as each a significant risk and an essential political prize. This time period has been used to explain the nation’s huge city underclass of boda boda riders, market distributors, and casual employees. Bobi Wine himself emerged from these neighborhoods and got here to personify their frustrations, turning his background right into a political platform that the ruling elite discovered deeply threatening. His enchantment tapped right into a broader generational actuality: For these born below Museveni, the outdated “liberation narrative”—the declare that he introduced peace, stability, and nationwide rebirth after years of civil conflict—carries little resonance. With a median age of 16, most Ugandans choose the regime not by its Eighties legacy however by as we speak’s hardships: unemployment, corruption, poor public providers.
Bobi Wine’s 2021 marketing campaign remodeled these frustrations right into a political pressure. The state responded with mass arrests, abductions, and surveillance. Since then, repression has been blended with co-optation: In 2024, in a significant corruption scandal, Mathias Mpuuga, the previous chief of the opposition in Uganda’s Parliament, admitted to accepting vital payouts. Though this transaction was technically sanctioned, it was extensively seen as a part of a broader sample of institutionalised, monetised corruption. On this context, a number of NUP MPs have defected to the ruling occasion. The federal government has additionally launched Financial savings and Credit score Cooperatives to supply small loans to constituencies such because the ghetto youth, who can obtain micro-credit schemes in Kampala and different cities. These schemes purchase loyalty, collect intelligence, and deter dissent. Accepting a authorities mortgage creates dependency; protesting dangers shedding it.
With Gen Z-led protests sweeping throughout Africa, the regime is doubling down on its mixture of carrots and sticks to regulate the ghetto youth. Via these efforts, it has briefly blunted the potential for city unrest, however it has not resolved the underlying anger.
Time, nevertheless, can’t be co-opted or kidnapped. Museveni has all the time prided himself on his relentless vitality—touring rural areas on lengthy marketing campaign trails, lecturing voters for hours below the solar. This time, his slowing tempo betrays the burden of his 81 years.
In early October, Museveni abruptly canceled a number of rallies, formally citing “state duties.” The euphemism fooled nobody. Additionally, later breaks from the marketing campaign had been interpreted as indicators of fatigue and declining well being. Throughout his endorsement ceremony in August, he theatrically jogged down a crimson carpet to exhibit vitality—a gesture that solely underscored the priority. For the primary time, different occasion actors—each bigwigs and youth teams—are immediately campaigning for Museveni, taking up his bodily demanding marketing campaign rallies.
In a system constructed nearly completely round one man, even minor indicators of frailty set off deep political tremors. Ministers, military officers, and occasion loyalists are positioning themselves for what comes subsequent.
Formally, Uganda’s establishments stay intact: a parliament, a cupboard, a ruling occasion. In follow, decision-making has lengthy shifted elsewhere. Museveni himself dismissed his ministers in 2021 as “fishermen,” a revealing metaphor that captured the hollowing out of governance. Actual authority now resides inside a decent net of relations and army loyalists.
On the middle of that net stands Muhoozi. His rise has been fastidiously managed—half dynastic venture, half insurance coverage coverage. The so-called “Muhoozi Mission,” a long-debated plan to arrange him for succession, has moved in suits and begins.
Muhoozi’s public persona complicates the story. He’s recognized for intense social media outbursts and provocative foreign-policy concepts equivalent to conquering the Kenyan capital of Nairobi. But, in current months, he has gone conspicuously silent. Many interpret this as tactical self-discipline, an effort to keep away from difficult his father through the marketing campaign.
Behind the scenes, nevertheless, Muhoozi’s affect is rising. His loyalists have been promoted throughout the army hierarchy, whereas older “historicals” from the unique Eighties guerrilla motion have been sidelined. Every reshuffle is learn as a sign: The transition is being choreographed quietly throughout the barracks, not debated in Parliament.
However the army is just one area the place the succession is taking form. One other, much less seen however equally consequential, is contained in the ruling occasion itself. Whereas the presidential vote is a foregone conclusion, elections to the Central Government Committee (CEC), the NRM’s highest decision-making physique, provide a glimpse into how energy in Uganda really works. Seats on the committee carry proximity to Museveni himself and by extension to the contracts, appointments, and favors that maintain the regime—in addition to a stake in shaping no matter transition comes subsequent.
Because of this, this 12 months’s CEC elections had been notably essential. Bribes reportedly ranged from $260 to $1,300 per delegate, whereas candidates supplied jobs for kin, enterprise alternatives, and even international journeys in alternate for help. In one of the vital contested votes, delegates had been ferried to lodges in Kampala and neighboring nations, each to safe their loyalty and to maintain them out of attain of competing bidders.
The CEC elections laid naked the true dynamics of succession politics. Although formally an inside occasion train, these contests decide who shall be greatest positioned in a post-Museveni order.
Museveni’s regime, like many long-standing autocracies, not competes with outsiders; it competes with itself. Its elections aren’t about legitimacy however about calibration—deciding learn how to distribute spoils with out destabilizing the pyramid.
That pyramid, nevertheless, is wobbling. The president’s age, the rising assertiveness of his son, and the deepening financial grievances of the younger majority make for a risky combine. The regime’s stability rests on its capability to handle a transition with out shedding management, to cross energy with out unleashing the very forces it has spent a long time suppressing.
For Museveni, grooming his son for the position affords a option to protect household energy whereas reassuring the military of continuity. However it’s a dangerous wager: Hereditary succession may fracture the fragile coalition that has sustained his rule. Many Ugandans, together with throughout the NRM, see it as dynastic overreach.
What occurs after the 2026 election will due to this fact outline the way forward for Uganda’s political order. If Muhoozi’s allies dominate the following cupboard or the occasion’s key committees, the handover could have begun. If not, the regime could limp on, awaiting a disaster to pressure its reckoning.
For now, the president’s marketing campaign focuses on acquainted guarantees—“wealth creation,” “peace,” “stability.” The city poor obtain token loans; the military receives new gear; and the elite scrambles for entry to the interior circle. Ugandans know this election is not going to change something. The result’s sure; the succession shouldn’t be. That uncertainty—who governs after Museveni and on what phrases—hangs over the nation like humidity earlier than a storm.
