Poor communication, understaffing, an absence of satisfactory planning and chaotic situations contributed to the failure to challenge well timed evacuation orders to elements of Altadena because the lethal Eaton fireplace raced by means of the neighborhood, in line with a long-awaited report launched Thursday.
The report didn’t assign blame to people for the botched alerts however discovered Los Angeles County had no clear course of for who ought to challenge evacuation orders and known as for important reforms. Nineteen individuals died within the fireplace, all however considered one of whom was present in west Altadena, an space that didn’t get evacuation alerts till hours after the hearth broke out.
The 132-page report launched Thursday appeared to downplay how early the hearth threatened west Altadena — regardless of 911 calls that reported flames and smoke within the space — and solely as soon as talked about the 19 individuals who died within the fireplace.
As an alternative, it targeted on the hearth’s “excellent storm,” poor preparation and the truth that the satellite-outlined “fireplace entrance” hadn’t entered west Altadena till 5 a.m., after evacuation alerts have been issued, although a number of spot fires have been confirmed within the space earlier within the evening.
The impartial investigation by consulting agency McChrystal Group, launched eight months after the Los Angeles space firestorm, got here after The Occasions revealed that the county didn’t challenge evacuation alerts in west Altadena till hours after smoke and flames from the Eaton fireplace had threatened the neighborhood.
Whereas areas east of Lake Avenue received evacuation orders simply after 7 p.m. on Jan. 7, most of west Altadena didn’t obtain any evacuation alerts till 3:30 a.m. Some zones didn’t obtain alerts till virtually 6 a.m., hours after individuals started reporting fireplace within the space to 911.
Officers informed The Occasions that the accountability to challenge evacuation orders was cut up amongst three businesses: the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Division, the Los Angeles County Fireplace Division and the county Workplace of Emergency Administration.
However Los Angeles County Sheriff Robert Luna later downplayed his division’s position, saying firefighters sometimes take the lead as a result of they’re “the consultants” in such conditions. The Workplace of Emergency Administration, which is answerable for sending out alerts, stated there have been no technical points.
With out assigning blame or explaining what went mistaken, the report confirmed that between 1 and three a.m. on Jan. 8, the county didn’t ship out any evacuation alerts — together with to west Altadena. The report stated that at the moment, “all areas [L.A. county fire officials] believed have been immediately impacted by or in danger from the Eaton Fireplace had already acquired an evacuation warning or order.”
However that was not the case.
The primary evacuation order for west Altadena got here at 3:25 a.m., after dispatchers acquired a minimum of 14 stories of fireside within the space, in line with 911 logs from the Los Angeles County Fireplace Division obtained by The Occasions.
The report stated that the preliminary requires fireplace didn’t match the placement of destroyed buildings, showing to query the validity of these early calls and the presence of flames. The report claimed that the primary 911 name for a hearth in west Altadena the place the construction was later confirmed broken got here simply earlier than 1 a.m. on Jan. 8 — nonetheless greater than two hours earlier than evacuation orders have been issued.
The stories gives two examples of Fireplace Division workers flagging that the hearth could also be burning west greater than an hour earlier than evacuations alerts went out for west Altadena.
A Fireplace Division workers member within the subject in Altadena stated they prompt to Unified Command workers a little bit earlier than midnight on Jan. 8 that, as a result of excessive winds, evacuation orders ought to exit for the foothills of Altadena, all the best way to La Cañada. Unified Command workers stated they didn’t recall this occurring and that the hearth entrance was not shifting west on the time.
About two hours later, at 2:18 a.m., a staffer with the county Fireplace Division radioed in that they noticed fireplace north of Farnsworth Park shifting west alongside the foothills.
Although some officers current within the decision-making course of informed investigators they’d taken notes within the subject about evacuation selections, the notes “have been both incomplete, not time-stamped, or not maintained.”
The report stated: “No official kind or documentation was utilized by LACoFD, LASD or OEM to collectively and formally document which zones ought to obtain evacuation orders or warnings, the time the choice was made, or the time the zones have been communicated to OEM workers on the EOC.”
The report additionally talked about — with out naming particular individuals or businesses — that the county “had considerations about over-warning” through the fireplace, worrying about including confusion, panic or pointless visitors points. State tips on alert and warning methods explicitly warn in opposition to this, as have consultants, repeatedly.
The report stated that primarily based on satellite tv for pc knowledge from the Nationwide Guard, the hearth entrance didn’t cross into western Altadena till round 5 a.m., two hours after evacuation orders had been issued. The report acknowledged that 911 calls have been coming in from the world hours earlier than the orders, however categorized these incidents as “spot fires.”
The report repeatedly mentions how situations created a “excellent storm” for firefighters, whereas highlighting that there appeared to be an actual focus about NASA’s Jet Propulsion Lab in La Cañada Flintridge catching fireplace, which may launch poisonous fumes if ignited.
Whereas the hearth initially burned eastward, firefighters quickly reported that it was spreading “in every single place abruptly” with wind gusts of 70 to 90 mph.
“Evacuation selections and messages couldn’t maintain tempo with the hearth,” the report acknowledged.
The report additionally claims that the hearth entered west Altadena as wind speeds elevated, describing it as a “extra densely populated” space with older properties constructed with supplies that have been “extra weak to ignition.”
The report discovered a number of issues with how the county carries out evacuations.
Typically, when officers evacuated a zone, they might mechanically evacuate the zone subsequent to it. However that apply was not codified and didn’t occur in western Altadena.
The report additionally identified that, for the inhabitants it serves, the county’s Workplace of Emergency Administration was significantly smaller than such businesses serving even smaller jurisdictions. “In comparison with OEMs in jurisdiction of comparable dimension (though not as giant or complicated), the Los Angeles County’s OEM has considerably much less workers, finances and autonomy over its working capabilities,” the report discovered.
The three businesses in cost additionally didn’t have a single platform with which to coordinate communication, exacerbating points with decision-making throughout the hearth response, the report discovered. Sheriff’s Division workers might not have been conscious in actual time of which zones have been beneath evacuation warnings or orders, as they weren’t at all times facet by facet with different businesses at Unified Command, in line with the report.
The report was carried out by the McChrystal Group, a consulting agency with expertise assessing authorities response to pure disasters. The report included dozens of interviews with fireplace and county officers in addition to public listening classes.
Throughout a Could 7 listening session, residents repeatedly informed the consultants that their evacuation orders had been dangerously delayed. “None of us actually acquired alerts,” stated one girl.
In 2019, virtually a yr after the Woolsey fireplace, the same report ready by Citygate Associates detailed how a number of simultaneous fires strained first responders’ skill to prioritize the place to ship individuals. The blaze destroyed some 1,600 buildings and killed three individuals.
Related points have been discovered with the county’s response this January, in line with the 2025 report. Each stories questioned the knowledge of additional growth in fire-prone areas, given officers’ acknowledged incapacity to defend the huge variety of Californians who dwell inside high-risk areas.
A Occasions investigation additionally discovered that the majority county fireplace vehicles didn’t shift into west Altadena till lengthy after it was ravaged by fireplace. Many county fireplace vehicles had already been deployed to the Palisades fireplace and to east Altadena. Los Angeles County Fireplace Chief Anthony C. Marrone stated the shortage of fireside vehicles in west Altadena most likely boiled right down to “human error” by fireplace officers who determined the place the vehicles ought to transfer.
