The 2-day assembly that started Monday between U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and Chinese language Vice Premier He Lifeng in Stockholm will probably be key to Washington and Beijing’s efforts to stabilize the truce of their chaotic, tit-for-tat commerce warfare. Much more importantly, it is going to even be a bellwether for a productive summit between U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese language President Xi Jinping, which is predicted to happen earlier than early November.
Though U.S.-China tensions have dominated headlines this 12 months, there’s cause to consider that this week’s assembly will lay the muse for Trump and Xi to ascertain a way more constructive relationship between the world’s two strongest nations.
The 2-day assembly that started Monday between U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and Chinese language Vice Premier He Lifeng in Stockholm will probably be key to Washington and Beijing’s efforts to stabilize the truce of their chaotic, tit-for-tat commerce warfare. Much more importantly, it is going to even be a bellwether for a productive summit between U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese language President Xi Jinping, which is predicted to happen earlier than early November.
Though U.S.-China tensions have dominated headlines this 12 months, there’s cause to consider that this week’s assembly will lay the muse for Trump and Xi to ascertain a way more constructive relationship between the world’s two strongest nations.
Right here’s my prediction for what’s to return: In what they could name a “nice rebalancing,” when Trump and Xi lastly meet, they’ll announce advances not solely on commerce however on different points, together with main investments in vitality and manufacturing, a critical Chinese language crackdown on exports of fentanyl precursors, a decision of the TikTok standoff, and guarantees of Chinese language purchases of extra U.S. merchandise to scale back the bilateral commerce deficit. The 2 leaders can even speak candidly in non-public about how they’ll work collectively to constrain the provocations of Taiwan’s present authorities.
If we stretch our minds, it’s even potential to think about that this summit will announce the muse of a brand new relationship—possibly even a “partnership”—between the 2 nations.
This forecast will not be primarily based on any leak of secret data. Certainly, if this occurs, it could genuinely shock many members of the Trump administration. After all, the long run is all the time unsure, and occasions can drive this astray. Nonetheless, after learning rigorously what each presidents have mentioned, weighing every one’s assessments of his personal pursuits, and analyzing the logic of the state of affairs, my hazy crystal ball suggests the percentages are higher than even that we’ll see one thing like this earlier than the tip of November.
In assessing Trump’s doubtless strategy to China, there are 4 principal issues that many analysts have missed. First, in contrast to a lot of the U.S. foreign-policy institution, together with many members of his personal administration, Trump will not be a China hawk. In a phrase affiliation sport, if the immediate had been China, he can be as more likely to reply “buddy” as “foe.”
One of the best proof for this comes from his presidential marketing campaign. Final 12 months, when round 81 % of Individuals had a unfavorable view of China, Trump was the one candidate campaigning for nationwide workplace who repeatedly had constructive issues to say about Beijing. In interviews, social media posts, and speeches, he mentioned, amongst different issues: “I like China”; “I very a lot respect President Xi”; “The press hates it once I name President Xi ‘good.’ Effectively, he’s an excellent man”; and “I need China to do nice.”
Second, Trump believes {that a} sturdy U.S. financial system is important for the Republican Celebration’s success within the midterm elections in November 2026—and that’s required for every part else he cares about. He additionally believes {that a} productive relationship with China is a prerequisite for a roaring U.S. financial system. This turned vivid for him in April, when, in a match of pique, he introduced 145 % tariffs on China and China responded with 125 % tariffs, rattling the U.S. financial system. When the Trump administration started curbing U.S. exports of superior semiconductors, and China retaliated by choking its exports of rare-earth magnets—that are important to producing U.S. vehicles and navy weapons—Trump blinked. His administration rescinded its export restrictions, gave Nvidia the greenlight to promote superior semiconductors to China, and instructed the Commerce Division to “keep away from robust strikes” on China, because the Monetary Instances reported.
Trump and his crew have concluded that the U.S. and Chinese language economies are so interdependent, and their provide chains so intertwined, that will probably be not possible to untangle them throughout his time period. Certainly, for many gadgets, they know even a nationwide marketing campaign to ascertain impartial provide chains would take a decade or longer. So, as most main U.S. and worldwide enterprise leaders have concluded, except sure military-related merchandise, Trump’s claims about “decoupling” from China and even considerably “de-risking” by disrupting U.S.-China commerce are largely rhetorical sizzling air.
Third, Trump sees himself because the dealmaker-in-chief. As he thinks about his legacy, he aspires to be remembered as a “nice peacemaker.” That won’t be potential until he crafts a deal that establishes a productive relationship with China. Given the darkish prospects for achievement in peacemaking in Ukraine and Gaza, Pax Pacifica could also be his finest likelihood.
Fourth, Trump’s view of Taiwan is extra suitable with China’s than any U.S. president since World Conflict II. As reported in memoirs and different dependable sources, throughout his first time period, when the topic of Taiwan arose within the Oval Workplace, Trump repeatedly in contrast the tip of a Sharpie with the dimensions of his desk, saying: That dot is Taiwan; the desk is China. He additionally mentioned: “Taiwan doesn’t give us something.” Trump reportedly denied Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te permission to cease in New York on a visit initially deliberate for August, and Reuters reported that Lai is now delaying his journey till “later this 12 months.”
For Xi, the case for a grand cut price is even less complicated. He believes that on each the commerce and export management fronts, China has a powerful hand. When Trump challenged China by saying what amounted to an embargo, Xi responded in a approach that confirmed his metal—whereas concurrently leaving an appropriate off-ramp.
On Xi’s agenda with america, after avoiding a catastrophic warfare, the difficulty he cares about most is Taiwan. Certainly, his marketing campaign to make China nice once more—what Beijing calls “the good rejuvenation of the Chinese language nation”—sees “reunification” with Taiwan as important. Taiwan will not be more likely to be settled as an actual property deal. However it’s not onerous to think about a future wherein america explicitly states its opposition to Taiwan’s independence and its unwillingness to be provoked right into a warfare with China over the island.
As we await the outcomes of the Stockholm assembly, we ought to be alert for clues to the highway forward. Whereas Washington’s disruptor-in-chief enjoys shocking his audiences and takes delight in being unpredictable, on this case even his fiercest critics ought to take into account the likelihood that he surprises the world on the upside.
