Think about China launching an invasion of Taiwan, and the US decides to come back to the island’s protection. Following the Pentagon’s doctrine and operational ideas for preventing such a battle, the U.S. Navy and Air Power launch hundreds of long-range missiles towards Chinese language ships, command facilities, and logistics hubs. Within the opening strikes alone, greater than 33,000 precision-guided munitions goal over 8,500 areas. Cyberattacks decimate Chinese language army networks and paralyze the management. Beijing is pressured to retreat or face defeat in what seems to be a swift, decisive U.S. success. Few U.S. lives are misplaced on this fast, technology-driven triumph.
If this looks as if the perfect situation to you, you’d be flawed. For as precision strikes destroy Chinese language missile launchers, command facilities, and communications networks, Beijing’s army leaders face cascading army failures whilst they’re remoted by degraded communications. In a second of panic concerning the fast success of their adversary, the Chinese language management could effectively take into account vertical escalation—the usage of nuclear weapons—earlier than its remaining capabilities are eradicated. Beijing would possibly authorize an illustration nuclear strike over open waters as a sign of resolve and as an try to halt U.S. operations. It’s then unclear whether or not Washington will interpret such an illustration as justification for preemptive nuclear strikes towards remaining Chinese language capabilities.
Think about China launching an invasion of Taiwan, and the US decides to come back to the island’s protection. Following the Pentagon’s doctrine and operational ideas for preventing such a battle, the U.S. Navy and Air Power launch hundreds of long-range missiles towards Chinese language ships, command facilities, and logistics hubs. Within the opening strikes alone, greater than 33,000 precision-guided munitions goal over 8,500 areas. Cyberattacks decimate Chinese language army networks and paralyze the management. Beijing is pressured to retreat or face defeat in what seems to be a swift, decisive U.S. success. Few U.S. lives are misplaced on this fast, technology-driven triumph.
This text has been tailored from How the US Would Struggle China: The Dangers of Pursuing a Fast Victory by Franz-Stefan Gady (Oxford College Press, 256 pp., $34.99, November 2025).
If this looks as if the perfect situation to you, you’d be flawed. For as precision strikes destroy Chinese language missile launchers, command facilities, and communications networks, Beijing’s army leaders face cascading army failures whilst they’re remoted by degraded communications. In a second of panic concerning the fast success of their adversary, the Chinese language management could effectively take into account vertical escalation—the usage of nuclear weapons—earlier than its remaining capabilities are eradicated. Beijing would possibly authorize an illustration nuclear strike over open waters as a sign of resolve and as an try to halt U.S. operations. It’s then unclear whether or not Washington will interpret such an illustration as justification for preemptive nuclear strikes towards remaining Chinese language capabilities.
It’s not China’s nuclear doctrine per se that creates this harmful escalation dynamic, however relatively the US’ most well-liked warfighting strategy. In contrast to Russia and the US, with their a lot bigger nuclear arsenals, Beijing could not but consider that it may possibly stand up to a U.S. nuclear first strike and nonetheless have the flexibility to strike again—the important deterrent towards a nuclear first strike to start with. China’s nuclear arsenal is quickly increasing, however it’s nonetheless small relative to that of the US. (China had roughly 600 operational warheads as of 2024 in comparison with the US’ estimated 3,700.) This vulnerability may compel Chinese language leaders to make use of nuclear weapons early in a battle relatively than threat shedding them to continued U.S. strikes.
The escalation threat is amplified by a specific facet of Chinese language armament: Its army possesses dual-capable missile methods and amenities that may launch each typical and nuclear warheads. U.S. strikes towards typical DF-21 medium-range ballistic missile websites or DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missile launchers and their command facilities could possibly be interpreted by Beijing as assaults on its nuclear deterrent, doubtlessly triggering Chinese language nuclear retaliation.
The DF-26 presents a very acute entanglement downside. These launchers include typical and nuclear warheads, which are sometimes positioned on the identical army bases. Brigades observe drills launching typical assaults earlier than reloading the launchers with nuclear warheads. If the US targets these missile websites to forestall typical strikes on U.S. forces, the Chinese language management could interpret the assaults as aimed towards the Chinese language nuclear deterrent and as preparation for a U.S. nuclear first strike. Within the warmth of battle, it is a harmful ambiguity that would inadvertently set off nuclear escalation.
U.S. army planners are caught in an not possible dilemma. By persevering with to give attention to the sort of battle they’ve all the time deliberate for—a fast, decisive army marketing campaign to paralyze Chinese language forces and their management—they’re rising the danger of that management seeing no approach out however escalation. On the similar time, useful resource constraints make these U.S. warfighting plans unlikely to achieve the primary place.
The warfare strategy that U.S. operational ideas favor—concentrating on Chinese language Command, Management, Communications, Computer systems, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) methods with long-range missiles and cyber results—would possibly additionally truly delay and not diminish the prospects for lengthy and damaging wars. These methods embody all the pieces from army communication networks to intelligence-gathering satellites and command headquarters that coordinate army operations.
Even when commanders are killed and command methods decimated in a mass barrage, planners shouldn’t assume that this interprets into a fast victory. Historical past means that forces typically proceed preventing till they’re bodily destroyed. Contemplate that enormous numbers of Russian generals have been killed within the first yr of Russia’s battle in Ukraine, but the forces they commanded proceed operations to at the present time. Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Islamic State remained efficient army forces regardless of focused decapitation—till their forces have been systematically destroyed in grinding army campaigns.
Nevertheless, the uncomfortable fact is that the US is just not ready for something near a grinding battle of attrition in East Asia. In current battle video games, the U.S. army was projected to exhaust its stockpile of maritime strike missiles in simply three days and its whole stock of standoff land-attack weapons in 10 to 14 days. Different munitions classes didn’t fare higher. Struggle video games confirmed that Taiwan, with assistance from the US and Japan, defeated a Chinese language amphibious invasion in most situations, however this victory got here at a devastating price: dozens of U.S. ships sunk, a whole lot of plane destroyed, and tens of hundreds of U.S. servicemembers killed. Latest information that the Pentagon is urgently pushing missile suppliers to double and even quadruple manufacturing of important weapons, together with lengthy vary anti-ship missiles and precision strike missiles must be welcomed. But it surely doesn’t resolve the escalation downside: The popular U.S. warfighting idea makes a nuclear trade extra, not much less, doubtless.
Given Washington’s lengthy and outsized affect on army pondering inside NATO, these dangers prolong far past the Pacific. Throughout current workshops with NATO battle planners and German high-ranking army officers that I attended, each teams confessed to a troubling hole between their very own plans for preventing a possible battle with Russia and the way political leaders in capitals like Berlin envision such confrontations unfolding. The escalation mechanics constructed into the U.S. army’s operational ideas are poorly understood outdoors army circles—and generally not effectively understood inside them.
Nuclear strategists typically brush off escalation considerations, embracing daring actions beneath the banner of deterrence. They echo Gen. Ulysses S. Grant’s admonishment to his officers through the 1864 Overland Marketing campaign, who feared what Accomplice Gen. Robert E. Lee may need up his sleeve. “Return to your command and attempt to suppose what we’re going to do ourselves, as a substitute of what Lee goes to do,” Grant reportedly stated.
To some extent, the strategists downplaying escalation dangers are proper. The mere risk of nuclear escalation shouldn’t stop the US from preventing China—that may be self-deterrence, which may imply shedding a battle earlier than it’s fought. But when the US is getting ready for the potential for having to battle, it must be clear concerning the remaining objectives, acceptable dangers, and methods to mitigate these dangers.
A greater approach ahead can be what I’d name a “good attritional strategy.” This is able to adapt the Pentagon’s deterrence-by-denial technique by specializing in beating again a Chinese language invasion with out essentially triggering vertical escalation. This strategy intentionally avoids widespread strikes on command and management property which might be doubtlessly linked to China’s nuclear deterrent, recognizing that such assaults could possibly be perceived by Beijing as existential threats to the survival of the Communist Get together regime.
Such an tailored technique accepts that trendy warfare between nice powers will doubtless be characterised by typical attrition. It prioritizes investments in weapons methods that ship larger firepower in shut fight: expanded torpedo manufacturing for the battle at sea, shorter-range unmanned methods working at scale, and medium-to-long-range air and missile protection methods positioned to repel invasion forces.
This doesn’t imply abandoning present deep strike capabilities completely, however relatively reverting to their unique position as instruments to form the battlespace relatively than because the decisive shortcut to victory or defeat. It means accepting that technological superiority alone can not assure swift success towards a peer competitor.
Sadly, embracing a sensible attritional strategy will not be possible as a result of continued incapability of the US to commit the mandatory sources, which in flip stems from the absence of political and social consensus about the necessity to militarily confront China over Taiwan within the first place. Certainly, shedding one-half to two-thirds of U.S. Air Power and Navy property, to not point out hundreds of service members, for the preservation of an impartial Taiwan, as some battle video games mission, won’t symbolize one of the best long-term technique for a worldwide energy like the US.
The idea for any technique, subsequently, is an trustworthy dialog about what People are keen to sacrifice for Taiwan’s independence. As army historian Michael Howard famous, the West has been “crusing by the fog of peace.” The larger the gap from the final nice energy battle, the larger the prospect of a catastrophic error.
The trail ahead requires abandoning comfy illusions. If the US chooses to defend Taiwan, it should construct the economic capability for protracted battle, embrace operational ideas that decrease escalation dangers, and truthfully talk to the American individuals what such a battle would price and why it might be fought. What the U.S. army can not do is to proceed crusing by the fog of peace and faux that technological superiority ensures swift success, that escalation dangers are manageable, and that wartime realities will align with peacetime assumptions. To borrow from the good Athenian strategist Thucydides: The following nice energy battle can be a stern trainer.
