The latest Israeli and U.S. war on Iran began with airstrikes on the home and offices of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. The premise seemed to be that Khamenei’s sudden elimination would pose a dire threat to the current ruling system. The goal would be to achieve what happened in Libya after Muammar al-Qaddafi or in Syria after Bashar al-Assad, where regimes collapsed as soon as their leaders were no longer in power. In those systems, the state’s future was tied to a single person.
But Iran’s history and approach to survival are different. Few contemporary governments concentrate as much visible authority in a single office as Iran does in that of the supreme leader. Religious legitimacy, command of the armed forces, and ultimate political arbitration converge there.
The latest Israeli and U.S. war on Iran began with airstrikes on the home and offices of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. The premise seemed to be that Khamenei’s sudden elimination would pose a dire threat to the current ruling system. The goal would be to achieve what happened in Libya after Muammar al-Qaddafi or in Syria after Bashar al-Assad, where regimes collapsed as soon as their leaders were no longer in power. In those systems, the state’s future was tied to a single person.
But Iran’s history and approach to survival are different. Few contemporary governments concentrate as much visible authority in a single office as Iran does in that of the supreme leader. Religious legitimacy, command of the armed forces, and ultimate political arbitration converge there.
Yet visibility should not be confused with fragility. The office rests atop a dense network of institutions designed not simply to serve the leader but to constrain him, monitor him, and, if necessary, outlast him. The Islamic Republic is not just a personal regime with religious language. It is a revolutionary system that has invested heavily in planning for leadership changes. When under pressure, its structure is designed to pull together rather than fall apart.
Iran’s political behavior cannot be understood without recognizing how deeply its ruling elite reads history. The Iranian state has experienced repeated periods of political vacuum over the centuries, and its political imagination remains defined by them. Every crisis is measured against earlier collapses, whether consciously or instinctively.
Even though Jafari Shiite law does not accept analogies, Iran’s leaders often use history as a guide, almost automatically. Events such as the fall of the Qajar dynasty, the Safavid collapse after Esfahan’s capture, the chaos after Nader Shah’s death, and the civil wars following Karim Khan Zand’s death all taught the same lesson: When there is no clear leader, the country risks falling apart.
For those who led the 1979 revolution, problems with leadership change were not just ideas—they were real warnings from history. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini did not eliminate the supreme authority; instead, he made it part of the system. The intense debates of 1979 about how to avoid past patterns of collapse led to new answers in Iran’s constitution: Each major body was created to solve a specific risk exposed by history.
The Guardian Council was formed to guard against political drift and to keep laws in line with Islamic principles. The Assembly of Experts took on the task of selecting and supervising the supreme leader, to prevent a concentration of power without oversight. The Expediency Council was established to resolve institutional deadlock, ensuring the system could continue to function even when high-level disagreements arose. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the intelligence agencies were meant to secure the revolution internally and externally, checking both foreign threats and domestic unrest.
This deliberate network of overlapping bodies was designed not just to add layers but to offer resilience: If one part failed, others could step up. The aim was to make sure the country would not rely on just one person to survive. Khomeini put it simply: Keeping the Islamic Republic safe is more important than protecting any one person, no matter how important. This way of thinking still shapes how leaders act.
The system faced its first big test early on. After President Abolhassan Banisadr was impeached, both President Mohammad Ali Rajai and Prime Minister Mohammad Javad Bahonar were elected and then killed within a month. Still, in less than 50 days, Khamenei became president, showing the regime could quickly find new leaders during a crisis. Eight years later, after Khomeini died, the same approach worked again. Khamenei, who did not have Khomeini’s charisma or top religious rank, became supreme leader because the institutions agreed, not because it was expected.
The main message within the Iranian state was clear: The system must outlast any one person. And recent events have shown this principle again. When President Ebrahim Raisi died in a helicopter crash in 2024, the constitution’s rules were followed right away. Power shifted smoothly, elections happened quickly, and the system stayed stable. Instead of causing chaos, the crisis acted as a practice run for handling sudden leadership changes.
Iran’s constitution explicitly anticipates sudden leadership loss. Article 111 stipulates that if the supreme leader dies or becomes incapacitated, authority transfers immediately to an interim council composed of the president, the head of the judiciary, and a senior cleric selected through the Expediency Council. The goal is to keep leadership steady, not to change the political system. Importantly, the constitution lists the qualifications for the next leader but does not limit the choice to a strict religious path.
This flexibility allows succession to be a process of negotiation and stability, not just a religious decision. There is no set deadline for picking a new leader. If there is a war, the interim council can lead for a long time. What might look like delay from the outside is actually a way to manage risks inside the country.
As for the succession process itself, while the Assembly of Experts officially votes, the real decisions happen much earlier. Usually, three informal steps help narrow down the choices. The IRGC does not officially select the supreme leader, but it has significant influence over which risks are acceptable. Candidates who might weaken the country’s defense or unity usually do not get much backing.
If the supreme leader’s position is vacant, the IRGC Intelligence Organization would likely watch top officials more closely and the Ground Forces would focus on keeping the country stable. The IRGC’s main goal would be to keep the system strong and independent—and to protect its own economic interests. Political culture flows through relational networks centered in Qom. Any successor must possess a theological profile capable of securing at least tacit validation from senior clerics.
Besides religious and security factors, the story around succession is important. It is shaped not only by institutions but also by how events are described. The way a leader dies affects what happens next. If a leader dies in war, the idea of martyrdom could mean only those seen as steady and strong will be considered.
The most sensitive time would probably come after the new leader is chosen, not before. The new leadership would have to quickly prove its authority at home and show stability to the outside world. In countries shaped by revolution and uncertainty, this proof is shown through actions, not just symbols.
During transitions, some actions may look confusing to outsiders. Moves that seem aggressive from abroad might actually be meant to reassure people inside the country and show that leadership is still strong. What looks like chaos from far away could really be an attempt to bring things back to normal. People often expect sudden collapse, but they may not see how the system is built to handle shocks. Different groups usually prefer to keep the system together rather than push their own interests too far.
Iran is frequently portrayed as a political order bound tightly to individuals. Yet the architecture that emerged after 1979 was formed by a different logic, one founded in the revolutionary experience itself. Khomeini captured this hierarchy in a remark often cited within Iran’s political elite: “Preserving the Islamic Republic is more important than preserving any individual, even if that individual were the Imam of the Age”—a reference to Shiism’s 12th Imam, Muhammad al-Mahdi.
It is still unclear whether the system will always follow this principle. But one should expect a change in leadership in Tehran to be treated less as an ending and more as a chance for the country’s institutions to show they can survive.
