What connects the White Home’s method to Pakistan and Panama, with a thread working by way of Canada, Greenland, and Ukraine? The reply might lie not in a grand principle of worldwide relations however within the Trump administration’s realization that it’s lagging behind China within the race for crucial minerals—and its clear need to catch up.
However what precisely are crucial minerals? Why do they matter a lot? Why does China dominate their provide chains and processing, and the way lengthy wouldn’t it take for america to catch up? For solutions, I turned to Gracelin Baskaran, the director of the Vital Minerals Safety Program on the Middle for Strategic and Worldwide Research. Subscribers can watch the total dialogue on the video field atop this web page or observe the FP Reside podcast for the audio interview. What follows here’s a flippantly edited transcript.
Ravi Agrawal: Let’s begin with some fundamental definitions. What are crucial minerals?
Gracelin Baskaran: Vital minerals are the minerals we want for nationwide, financial, and vitality safety. However in addition they have a excessive probability of provide chain disruption. Typically which means China controls that mineral. Typically it’s a mineral produced in a single mine in a single nation, so if there was a disruption to that mine, it might undermine our provide chain safety.
RA: What about “uncommon earths”—the place do they match into this?
GB: The U.S. Geological Survey has recognized a checklist of about 60 crucial minerals. Of these, 17 are what we name “uncommon earths.” Uncommon earths are literally all over the place, however the issue is discovering them in a focus dense sufficient to make them economical to extract.
RA: What are the principle makes use of of uncommon earths and important minerals? Why are they so essential?
GB: Uncommon earths have entered the discourse as a result of we use them in everlasting magnets, that are utilized in each type of protection expertise: fighter jets, warships, tanks, lasers, missiles. If we don’t have entry to them, it undermines our capability to guard ourselves, which leaves us actually nervous at a time of rising geopolitical stress, significantly within the Indo-Pacific. We use crucial minerals at massive in just about each type of shopper expertise and vitality, which makes it essential to our very existence.
RA: So there are crucial minerals in smartphones, inner combustion automobiles, and electrical autos. How a lot of those minerals are packed into these?
GB: I’m from Detroit, so I see it by way of the auto business lens. A gasoline-powered car makes use of about 32 kilograms of crucial minerals, and electrical autos use round 210. That’s a sixfold enhance. A traditional gasoline-powered car makes use of zero kilograms of graphite, however EVs use about 62 kilograms. That’s 1.2 occasions my physique weight of a mineral I’ve by no means considered. So the worldwide vitality transition makes use of important portions of latest minerals that we haven’t wanted earlier than, however that we want loads of now.
RA: Which international locations are the principle producers of all of those crucial minerals?
GB: There’s a false impression that China produces all of the minerals. Of the principle minerals like uncommon earths, cobalt, copper, lithium, nickel, graphite, China is definitely solely a top-three producer for 2 of these. However they’re a top-three processor for all six, which implies minerals from Africa and Latin America have traditionally gone to China for processing.
A few of the greatest lithium and copper producers are Chile and Argentina. South Africa is among the greatest producers of platinum group metals; for cobalt, it’s the Democratic Republic of the Congo. However the problem is that China has provide chain management as a result of most of those minerals finally go there for processing.
RA: Speak a little bit bit in regards to the numbers right here. China has an enormous monopoly in processing, however that’s additionally divided up between the heavy crucial minerals and the lighter ones.
GB: Of the six minerals I discussed, China processes between 40 and 90 % worldwide. One motive we’re so apprehensive about China’s export controls on uncommon earths this yr is as a result of they course of about 70 to 80 % of these. However there’s a distinction between mild uncommon earths and heavy uncommon earths, that are titled based mostly on their atomic weight. China’s export controls this yr didn’t contact mild uncommon earths—partly as a result of there’s greater diversification of the place these mild uncommon earths are processed globally. China processes about 60 % of sunshine uncommon earths. However China did prohibit heavy uncommon earths this yr, which they processed 99.5 % of when these restrictions got here out. This made it just about unattainable to get a everlasting magnet that didn’t have Chinese language heavy uncommon earths at first of this yr.
RA: Why is that? Is it due to the infrastructure required? Is it due to a willingness to tolerate environmental injury?
GB: China has an absolute benefit in lots of areas. First, geology—the U.S. has uncommon earths; we even have the second-biggest-producing uncommon earth mine on the planet. Nevertheless, we don’t have loads of heavy earths, though we’re significantly well-endowed with mild uncommon earths. So for lots of the transactions and help we’ve offered within the U.S., we all know we want heavy uncommon earths from elsewhere.
Secondly, China labored by way of a really focused technique, lining up their international coverage to get these uncommon earths from all over the world alongside a home industrial technique to course of them at residence. Third, processing uncommon earths is extraordinarily energy-intensive. Separating a ton of uncommon earths makes use of about 9 to 13 occasions as a lot vitality as simply taking them out of the bottom. China used many years of effort to construct low-cost coal-fired energy that allowed them to do this.
Fourth, it has a very huge environmental footprint. Within the U.S. and lots of European international locations, we take a “Not in My Yard” stance. However China was completely happy to soak up that environmental footprint in change for world dominance, which sustained their aggressive benefit.
RA: When did China determine to begin doing this? And the way lengthy wouldn’t it take for America to catch up, if it did all the pieces it presumably might?
GB: In 1910, the U.S. opened the Bureau of Mines, which was the U.S. authorities’s effort to have a coordinated method. Till 1996, the Bureau of Mines coordinated our efforts, pushing analysis and improvement, managing information, and ensuring we had the assets we wanted. However once we closed the bureau, that’s the place we ceded our benefit in a variety of commodities. Uncommon earths had been a type of: We truly was once a prime uncommon earth producer. We ceded our uranium benefit, from being the world’s prime uranium producer to now being depending on international locations like Russia. At that very same time, across the Nineties, China determined it wished to grow to be a superpower. It used methods just like the Belt and Highway Initiative, focused funding, and international coverage to get these minerals from all over the world.
On common, it takes 18 years to construct a mine, from the time of deposit identification to the time of manufacturing. So the problem that we face right now is China now has a 40-year benefit. Within the U.S., now we have to open new mines and construct processing amenities to counter that dominance. However we’re in all probability taking a look at a decade.
RA: Is it honest to say that crucial minerals have grow to be a way more essential a part of policymaking within the U.S. below the Trump administrations, or is that this one thing that [Barack] Obama and [Joe] Biden additionally paid consideration to?
GB: Minerals are one of many few areas of bipartisan help. In 2017, President [Donald] Trump handed the primary govt order on crucial minerals. The Biden administration constructed on these efforts as a result of two and a half years in the past, China restricted germanium and gallium, that are essential for our semiconductor business. Over the course of the Biden administration, we had export controls on graphite, tungsten, and antimony—so we did double down our efforts.
Nevertheless, there’s been a fast acceleration in 2025. Domestically, the U.S. authorities grew to become the greatest shareholder in MP [Materials], a uncommon earth firm. Minerals have additionally outlined our foreign-policy method to Africa, Ukraine, Saudi Arabia, and South America. Even in an “America First” period, we realized lower than a month after Trump’s inauguration that we weren’t going to satisfy our minerals wants alone, which is when minerals grew to become actually embedded into our international coverage.
RA: So if crucial minerals outline Trump’s international coverage in his second time period, how are you seeing that play out in a spread of various international locations?
GB: First, the U.S. is forging new alliances based mostly on minerals. Three or 4 years in the past, the concept we might lean into Pakistan, and {that a} Pakistani official could be within the Oval Workplace opening a field of minerals in entrance of the president, seemed like a film. However international locations current themselves to this administration by displaying the worth addition they’ve from a minerals perspective.
Second, historic alliances have been redrawn. We’ve had an oil-for-security settlement with Saudi Arabia, and over time we wanted their oil much less. However President Trump signed a memorandum of cooperation for minerals, and now the U.S. authorities goes to be a 49 % proprietor of a uncommon earths refinery in Saudi Arabia—which has phenomenal heavy uncommon earths.
Third, we’ve approached bilateralism and multilateralism centered round minerals. There was an actual concern in January that the U.S. was not going to take part in multilateralism. However the G-7 cooperation has actually centered on crucial minerals, speaking about requirements and dealing to discover a worth flooring mechanism to create an ex-China market. Bilateral agreements with Japan, Australia, Saudi Arabia, and Ukraine have centered on minerals. So our worldwide engagement has not been pushed by assist or safety efforts, however by minerals.
RA: Vital minerals usually really feel actually weaponized. A part of that’s as a result of China flexed its muscle tissues, particularly within the final yr, by proscribing the exports of crucial minerals and uncommon earths. Do you suppose China overplayed its hand?
GB: China completely overplayed its hand. In the beginning of this yr, it was exhausting to see how different international locations had been going to interact with the Trump administration. However these uncommon earth export controls that got here on this yr weren’t focused on the U.S.—they hit each nation. Suzuki needed to cease producing in Japan; European automotive corporations had challenges with getting provides. The export controls grew to become a mobilizing name to speed up efforts to create a resilient provide chain past China—now it’s a ticking clock earlier than China loses that leverage.
RA: This acceleration you’re describing occurred regardless of very hostile language from the White Home, particularly with reference to Canada and Greenland and strong-arming Ukraine as they seemed to barter a peace deal. One may think that might drive these international locations aside, however you’re saying China’s actions introduced them collectively.
GB: Completely. Minerals had been the rallying coordinating effort for the G-7+ on the G-7 summit. First, they want resilient provide chains. Second, China has overproduced minerals. Chinese language corporations in Indonesia, for instance, have elevated nickel manufacturing by 400 % within the final 5 years. This has compelled costs to come back down so low that Western corporations like BHP in Australia or Glencore in New Caledonia went out of enterprise, rising China’s dominance. Consequently, international locations have come collectively to work collectively on worth help, maintaining Chinese language funding out, and stopping China from buying new initiatives. So it actually did grow to be the rallying cry regardless that the U.S. is in an advanced standing with loads of these international locations, together with Canada, who hosted the G-7.
RA: What does the U.S. have to do within the subsequent few years to meet up with China on provide chains, and finally processing?
GB: That is all very costly, so we’re going to want capital. Within the U.S.-Australia deal, every nation pledged to place a billion {dollars} forth within the subsequent six months. But it surely’s such a long-term business; globally, it takes 18 years to develop a undertaking, and in America, it’s 29 years. So capital intervention is de facto essential to attempt to deal with a few of these challenges.
The second factor is technical know-how. China’s uncommon earth export restrictions in October prohibited Chinese language nationals from engaged on uncommon earths—manufacturing, processing, everlasting magnet manufacturing—wherever outdoors of China with out express permission from the federal government to restrict the leakage of technical know-how. We’ve simply woken as much as the fact that we don’t even know tips on how to do a few of these refining processes, in order that’s the place we want international locations like Canada and Australia, the place about two-thirds of the highest 12 mine engineering applications sit.
Even when the U.S. desires to do all the pieces right here, now we have lower than 1 % of the world’s cobalt, nickel, and graphite, so we’re going to want to associate with international locations the place that feedstock is. It’s compelled cooperation to make sure that even when we construct these refining capabilities right here or in our close-knit allies, the minerals come from a farther attain, which is precisely what China did.
RA: Are you saying China doesn’t have a stranglehold on all of these international locations with assets? What wouldn’t it take for America to get in on that recreation?
GB: There’s a lot higher competitors for these assets right now in comparison with 5 or 10 years in the past. Nations need to get higher offers for his or her minerals and get boosts in infrastructure, jobs, native worth addition, and the event of latest industries. A few of the new gamers on the scene—the [United Arab Emirates], Saudi Arabia, Australia, Canada, the U.S., sure European international locations—are making a lot greater performs. That is significantly essential in Africa, the place assets are driving stress in international locations with quickly rising youth populations. They’re attempting to seize a bigger share of advantages to remain in energy, so that they’re taking a look at who can provide them the perfect bundle.
RA: The place does recycling match into this? So many of those crucial minerals have been mined already; they exist in our units and automobiles. May there be a method of reusing that in different merchandise, and will America make a push to be a frontrunner in recycling?
GB: This administration is definitely prioritizing recycling, however we’re solely simply beginning to develop an understanding of tips on how to recycle uncommon earths. Early on on this administration, the federal government was taking a look at imposing a black mass export ban, which might make it unlawful to export everlasting magnets in order that China might get the uncommon earth again out of them. The problem is we don’t have the aptitude to recycle domestically, which implies if we ban exports, we’ll simply have landfills filled with stuff.
So we’re now investing in understanding tips on how to recycle. The IEA [International Energy Agency] has estimated that we’ll meet perhaps 20 % of future demand by recycling, however I might problem that quantity. Ten years in the past, we couldn’t get 98 % of lithium out of a lithium-ion battery, however we are able to right now as a result of we invested in that analysis and improvement. Recycling will likely be a very essential a part of our safety efforts, however we’re by no means going to satisfy all of our demand going ahead by way of secondary materials, as a result of our demand is rising considerably.
RA: How a lot of our considering across the surroundings needs to be tailored? The early leaders on crucial minerals both have the flexibility to repress their folks or shut down dissent over environmental injury, or are in poorer international locations the place the general public doesn’t have the means to make {that a} huge difficulty. What ought to the West take into account because it appears to be like to rebalance provide dominance?
GB: Surroundings has been a really politically charged matter because it pertains to mining. The Democrats speak lots in regards to the surroundings, social governance, and ESG, whereas Republicans push away from that narrative. I might problem either side, as a result of finally the surroundings is essential to the industrial viability of operations. When communities cease a mine, or a allow will get taken to court docket for environmental causes, initiatives might be stopped for many years. However managing the environmental externalities of mining is essential to making sure that that undertaking has a social license to function. Yearly, Ernst and Younger surveys mining executives, and social license to function is normally the primary or second most delicate difficulty for mining executives.
Firms are doing actually progressive issues to handle environmental externalities. Mining is far cleaner now than it was 30 years in the past—corporations have invested into making certain that there is no such thing as a acid mine leakage into soil, that they aren’t polluting water and dumping in a method that undermines meals safety. It’s essential that folks perceive that as a result of the surroundings is such a political problem.
RA: The Trump administration and China have weaponized crucial minerals to various levels, and it’s grow to be a giant a part of international coverage writ massive. Will this be the case simply so long as Trump is in energy, or will this be the brand new foreign-policy norm over the subsequent couple of many years?
GB: 2025 was a wake-up name to us, just like what Japan skilled in 2010, when China reduce Japan off of uncommon earths. We are able to be taught from the Japanese, as a result of Japan now has probably the most progressive mineral safety insurance policies. Japan owns 50 % of a uncommon earth undertaking in rural Namibia referred to as Lofdal; they’ve spectacular stockpiling necessities, not just for corporations, but additionally as a federal authorities; they’ve been very aggressive in innovation and can pilot uncommon earth deep-sea mining early subsequent yr. It was a mandatory wake-up name, and 15 years later, it’s by no means left them.
Equally, I don’t suppose the 2025 wake-up name will go away us. The U.S. auto manufacturing business stopped this yr on account of this disruption, so it’s not only a distant nationwide safety difficulty, however impacts the roles and livelihoods of all People. Nevertheless, I don’t know if we’ll at all times see this degree of depth. It’s very seemingly that this stays for 3 to 5 years, then turns into a extra sustainable effort to help our mineral safety. Mineral prioritization is right here to remain, however perhaps not on the degree of 2025, which was compelled on us by China’s restrictions in April.
RA: What occurs if China does that once more?
GB: My worry is that China is doing it in a method that’s not going to cease. 2024 was a 10-year excessive in China buying mines from all over the world, and loads of these mines aren’t in manufacturing but. They’re dormant weapons: Since they aren’t presently producing, they’re not in our provide chain calculus. So there’s a very actual world the place, if the U.S., Australia, and Europe pull their foot off of the fuel pedal, China will increase weaponization.
For this reason it’s so essential that we institutionalize a home coordinated minerals effort. Since closing the Bureau of Mines, there are actually 15 authorities departments engaged on minerals with out that coordinating operate. We want to consider a long-term sustainable mechanism for the U.S. authorities, as a result of that’s the degree of coordination that China has—and I’m unsure now we have totally wrapped our head round that.
RA: Do you suppose the Trump administration is doing sufficient?
GB: The Trump administration is engaged on minerals from the standpoint of a nationwide disaster, so it hasn’t considered long-term institutionalization—an company to proceed these efforts past this administration. We don’t need a rebound that may include a change in authorities. We have now a democracy, and we have to institutionalize a few of these mechanisms for longevity, which would require working with Congress greater than now we have.
