The much-anticipated NATO summit in The Hague in late June achieved its core targets: securing a 5 p.c protection pledge, managing U.S. President Donald Trump, and reaffirming a dedication to collective safety. However the summit additionally drew criticism for sidestepping or neglecting onerous questions.
Among the many onerous however essential questions left unaddressed was NATO’s engagement with the Indo-Pacific. Forging deeper relations with the alliance’s regional companions, often called the Indo-Pacific 4 (IP4)—Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea—can be essential to NATO’s skill to counter rising cross-regional threats to Euro-Atlantic safety. Absent refocused consideration, these relationships danger being undermined by unconstructive and erratic U.S. coverage.
The much-anticipated NATO summit in The Hague in late June achieved its core targets: securing a 5 p.c protection pledge, managing U.S. President Donald Trump, and reaffirming a dedication to collective safety. However the summit additionally drew criticism for sidestepping or neglecting onerous questions.
Among the many onerous however essential questions left unaddressed was NATO’s engagement with the Indo-Pacific. Forging deeper relations with the alliance’s regional companions, often called the Indo-Pacific 4 (IP4)—Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea—can be essential to NATO’s skill to counter rising cross-regional threats to Euro-Atlantic safety. Absent refocused consideration, these relationships danger being undermined by unconstructive and erratic U.S. coverage.
NATO’s partnerships with the IP4 have progressed steadily since 2022. On the Madrid summit that yr, the leaders of all 4 international locations had been invited to attend for the primary time. Their presence signaled rising alignment, notably round NATO’s new strategic idea, which recognized China as posing “systemic challenges” to Euro-Atlantic safety. In 2023, the alliance formalized ties with the IP4 on the Vilnius summit by signing Individually Tailor-made Partnership Packages (ITPPs)—a key mechanism for structured cooperation with nonmembers.
By the 2024 Washington summit, NATO had moved towards operationalizing IP4 engagement. A number of initiatives had been launched, together with help for Ukraine’s army well being care, cooperation on cyber protection and initiatives to counter disinformation, and joint work on accountable army makes use of of synthetic intelligence.
The logic of this engagement is evident. Whereas NATO’s space of duty is the North Atlantic, threats from the Indo-Pacific—starting from illegal and coercive Chinese language actions within the South China Sea to North Korean arms transfers and troop deployments to Russia—have direct penalties for Euro-Atlantic safety. Stronger Indo-Pacific partnerships are important for confronting cross-regional threats and upholding the worldwide rule of legislation, and due to this fact for safeguarding NATO’s core pursuits.
But, this trajectory of IP4 engagement faltered at The Hague. After three consecutive years of leader-level participation, solely New Zealand Prime Minister Christopher Luxon attended.
The absence of the opposite leaders shouldn’t be overinterpreted. Australia despatched its deputy prime minister and protection minister, who introduced a deliberate deployment to Europe of a Royal Australian Air Pressure Wedgetail plane and as much as 100 Australian Defence Pressure personnel. Japan was represented by its minister of international affairs, and South Korea by its nationwide safety advisor. NATO and the IP4 additionally issued a joint assertion that, whereas gentle on specifics, reaffirmed “shared strategic pursuits and customary values” and pledged to “discover collaboration” in areas comparable to house, maritime safety, and protection industrial ties.
Nonetheless, the absence of three of the 4 IP4 leaders—all U.S. allies (New Zealand is the one IP4 nation that’s not a proper U.S. treaty ally)—factors to potential fault strains. Their choices to skip the summit seemed to be rooted in mounting frustrations with or considerations about Washington.
Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba canceled after Tokyo withdrew from a deliberate 2+2 assembly in Washington, reportedly after the USA requested Japan to spice up protection spending to three.5 p.c of its GDP, larger than Washington’s earlier request. Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese is claimed to have declined to attend after his scheduled bilateral assembly with Trump on the G-7 in Canada was abruptly scrapped with no rescheduling in The Hague. South Korea, in the meantime, was anxious about navigating its response to the Israel-Iran disaster and the way Washington would possibly react. Even underneath its earlier authorities, Seoul had paused ammunition transfers that might help Ukraine after Trump’s reelection, purportedly awaiting readability on U.S. coverage towards Ukraine and NATO underneath the brand new administration.
Regardless of clear progress since 2022, the energy of IP4 engagement with NATO nonetheless seems to be a operate of every nation’s bilateral relationship with the USA. It is a fragile foundation for transregional cooperation. If Euro-Atlantic interconnectedness with the Indo-Pacific is to be greater than a slogan, the IP4 international locations should decouple their NATO engagement from the ups and downs of their ties with Washington. NATO, for its half, ought to deal with deepening ties with the IP4 straight, constructing relationships sturdy sufficient to resist strains in accomplice ties with the USA.
To NATO’s credit score, outreach to the IP4 over the previous three years has been vital. Whereas the USA helped catalyze the deepening ties, the momentum additionally got here from a broader consensus throughout the alliance. The problem shifting ahead is to maintain and insulate this progress from U.S. disruption.
This may require stronger institutional hyperlinks. One such possibility is a standing coordination mechanism for NATO-IP4 engagement. This would offer continuity and coherence, serving to to maintain strategic dialogue, monitor progress, and information sensible collaboration, even amid instability in U.S. relations with particular person IP4 companions.
Such a mechanism may oversee a set of issue-specific working teams targeted on shared priorities. Amongst these can be maritime area consciousness, technical house cooperation, and the initiatives launched on the Washington summit—specifically, army medical help for Ukraine, cyber protection and counter-disinformation, and the accountable army makes use of of synthetic intelligence.
Critics of NATO’s Indo-Pacific engagement usually increase two considerations. First, even because the areas turn out to be extra interconnected, they argue that NATO shouldn’t be the appropriate automobile for engagement. Certainly, many Indo-Pacific international locations, aside from the IP4, fear that NATO involvement may heighten tensions or contribute to militarization. Second, critics warn that NATO—with warfare on the continent and restricted sources—can’t afford to stretch itself additional.
What critics miss, nevertheless, is that NATO’s Indo-Pacific position is to not venture army power. This isn’t all the time clearly or persistently communicated, or even perhaps internalized, permitting China to distort the alliance’s position and intentions within the area. However the actuality is that NATO is searching for to have interaction in strategically related, defense-adjacent areas, comparable to maritime area consciousness, house, cybersecurity, disinformation, and rising applied sciences.
In these domains, the alliance ought to strengthen defense-related cooperation with like-minded companions, coordinate deterrence throughout theaters, and reinforce worldwide legislation. A number of European members—France, the UK, Germany, and the Netherlands—already deploy naval belongings and personnel to the Indo-Pacific. NATO may assist coordinate these nationwide efforts, lending coherence and continuity.
With a clearly outlined scope, NATO may ease regional considerations about its position and intent, and its efforts would complement, fairly than duplicate, the work of the European Union, the G-7, minilaterals, or regional organizations. As for overstretch, Europe’s safety is already wrapped up within the Indo-Pacific. China’s materials, technological and diplomatic help for Russia, together with North Korean weapons and troops, have prolonged the warfare in Ukraine and intensified long-term stress on Europe. Instability within the Indo-Pacific may additionally draw U.S. sources away from the continent. It’s due to this fact in Europe’s pursuits to assist bolster deterrence within the Indo-Pacific, no matter whether or not Washington thinks it is a good thought.
The Hague summit achieved what it got down to do. However NATO ought to now widen its aperture—not solely to deepen European functionality, but additionally to strengthen Indo-Pacific ties, whether or not with the IP4 or past. This may require NATO to make clear its reputable pursuits within the Indo-Pacific, the position it’s going to play, and the way it will add to peace and prosperity there.
To navigate a extra contested world with unsure U.S. help, NATO should forge Indo-Pacific partnerships resilient sufficient to climate the storms forward.
