“Don’t be a troublesome man. Don’t be a idiot!” U.S. President Donald Trump implored Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in a 2019 letter. The jury may be out on how robust or versatile Erdogan is, however he’s definitely no idiot. Certainly, he has confirmed his ability at taking part in Trump. Not lengthy after receiving the White Home’s missive (which he theatrically threw within the bin, in line with reviews), Erdogan obtained Washington to swallow a Turkish navy intervention in Syria directed towards the USA’ Kurdish allies.
On Sept. 25, the Turkish chief was again to the White Home, able to do extra geopolitical enterprise along with his “valued pal,” Trump. However the truth that talks yielded so little highlights the extent to which the USA and Turkey diverge. The chemistry between Trump and Erdogan, two strongmen with reputations for wheeling and dealing, makes issues higher—however solely barely.
“Don’t be a troublesome man. Don’t be a idiot!” U.S. President Donald Trump implored Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in a 2019 letter. The jury may be out on how robust or versatile Erdogan is, however he’s definitely no idiot. Certainly, he has confirmed his ability at taking part in Trump. Not lengthy after receiving the White Home’s missive (which he theatrically threw within the bin, in line with reviews), Erdogan obtained Washington to swallow a Turkish navy intervention in Syria directed towards the USA’ Kurdish allies.
On Sept. 25, the Turkish chief was again to the White Home, able to do extra geopolitical enterprise along with his “valued pal,” Trump. However the truth that talks yielded so little highlights the extent to which the USA and Turkey diverge. The chemistry between Trump and Erdogan, two strongmen with reputations for wheeling and dealing, makes issues higher—however solely barely.
The truth is that the issues in U.S.-Turkish relations are baked in, and the alternatives for breakthroughs are small. Furthermore, the stakes aren’t that prime anymore, and U.S.-Turkish relations are a a lot duller affair than they have been throughout Trump’s first time period. Because of this, each side are pleased to get pleasure from a photograph op and pocket what wins they’ll.
Trump’s return to energy has been hailed in Ankara as a chance. From the outset, Erdogan’s camp believed that the U.S. administration was amenable to Turkish pursuits. When Trump’s overtures to Moscow facilitated resumed Russian-Ukrainian talks in Istanbul, Turkish commentators cited it as proof of his standing as a mover and shaker in worldwide politics. After the autumn of Bashar al-Assad strengthened Turkey’s place in Syria, leaders Ankara imagine that this provides them extra playing cards with the Trump administration. Now, Turkey hopes that it may possibly play a job in Trump’s new plans for a postwar settlement in Gaza as properly.
The try and domesticate ties to Washington is happening towards the backdrop of a broader Turkish push to shore up relations with the West. Sure, Erdogan did flip up in China for the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in August and took half within the BRICS+ gathering in Russia again in October 2024.
However concurrently, Turkey has moved to strengthen strategic ties to Europe. Ankara has repeatedly touted its potential contribution to the so-called “coalition of the keen,” a gaggle gathered round France and the UK with the objective of sending an expeditionary drive to Ukraine in case there’s a cease-fire.
With this in thoughts, Ankara has been desirous to take part in present NATO efforts to comprise Russia. The Turkish Air Pressure just lately dispatched an E-7T Peace Eagle Airborne Early Warning and Management System airplane to Lithuania as half to the alliance’s response to escalating Russian drone and fighter jet violations on its jap flank. Turkey has moreover utilized to hitch the Safety Motion for Europe (SAFE) plan, a 150 billion euro ($176 billion) scheme proposed by the European Fee to encourage joint navy procurement throughout the European Union and presumably amongst its exterior companions.
Lastly, Turkey has continued its long-standing push to replace the prevailing EU-Turkey customs union to cowl providers and public procurement. With each Europe and Turkey squeezed by Trump’s tariffs and China’s financial enlargement, deepening integration makes an excessive amount of sense.
There’s a U.S. a part of the story, too, which predates Trump. The Russian invasion of Ukraine drove up Turkey’s geopolitical inventory on each side of the Atlantic, and Erdogan stays eager to use that temper. In 2024, Turkey secured a cope with the Biden administration to modernize its present fleet of F-16 jets and purchase 40 further plane. Although the modernization factor has been dropped, the remainder of the contract nonetheless being applied. The F-16 cut price concerned Ankara’s approval for Finland and Sweden’s accession to NATO. Erdogan now hopes he can buy F-35 fighter jets as properly, regardless of U.S. considerations that their safety can be compromised by Turkey’s possession of the Russian-made S-400 anti-aircraft system.
However neither Erdogan’s bromance with Trump nor his feelers to the West (or no matter stays of it) are sufficient to supply a real rapprochement between Turkey and United States.
First, there’s little proof that Turkey and the USA can workforce up on Gaza. Erdogan insisted following the White Home assembly that Turkish officers had reached a typical understanding with Trump, however Trump didn’t affirm that. There are nonetheless many unanswered questions, not least whether or not Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Hamas are on board with the most recent set of proposals made by Trump’s envoy Steve Witkoff. Lastly, the precise position that Turkey would play after a putative cease-fire stays unclear: Israel is skeptical of Turkish involvement, and Ankara may be sad if it was relegated to a standing behind that of the Gulf states.
Second, Turkey won’t drop vitality ties with Russia to reorient to the USA, one in all Trump’s key asks. Certain, BOTAS, the Turkish state-controlled fuel utility, signed a 20-year contract for U.S. liquefied pure fuel (LNG) within the run-up to Erdogan’s go to. However the annual 4 billion cubic meters of fuel lined by the deal is a couple of fifth of what Turkey imports yearly from Russia by the TurkStream and Blue Stream pipelines. As with different BOTAS contracts, the LNG cope with the USA is a hedge towards future disruptions and value fluctuations relatively than a substitute for the Russian volumes.
Furthermore, Turkey has not given up on its long-standing ambitions to resell Russian fuel to different prospects in Europe. Its corporations have already made some huge cash by buying crude from Russia and passing on refined merchandise to EU international locations. All this makes Trump’s demand laborious to just accept.
Ditto with the memorandum of understanding on civilian nuclear vitality signed throughout Erdogan’s White Home go to. As a lot as the USA needs a chunk of the Turkish market, the actual fact stays that Turkey’s one present nuclear energy plant, Akkuyu, is being constructed and operated by a subsidiary of Russia’s Rosatom company and on account of come on-line by 2028. Progress on any new, U.S.-built plant can be gradual. Uncertainty over funding and vitality costs might simply derail the undertaking earlier than it turned economically viable.
Third, regardless of the optimistic tone and Trump’s hints that Turkey could possibly purchase F-35s, his talks with Erdogan achieved little on the difficulty. Structural obstacles, such because the U.S. sanctions imposed on Turkey for its buy of the Russian S-400 missiles, stay in place. There’s no important mass of assist within the U.S. Congress to greenlight a resumption of cooperation with Turkey’s protection procurement company.
Erdogan’s goodwill gestures—dropping some tariffs on U.S. imports and reportedly providing to purchase lots of of Boeing plane—may match on Trump, however they won’t placate lawmakers on Capitol Hill. Stories a couple of congressional block on the export of engines for Turkey’s personal Kaan jet are being met with disappointment in Ankara.
But when not one of the massive hopes for this bilateral assembly are realized, it could not matter a lot. Turkey has tailored properly to a multipolar world outlined by diminished U.S. affect. For Erdogan, the most important advantage of the go to was creating the impression that Trump supported his crackdown on the opposition Republican Folks’s Celebration. But Erdogan’s authoritarian march would have occurred regardless.
Briefly, the USA and Turkey don’t want one another as a lot as they did prior to now. Ankara doesn’t want U.S. assist towards Russia the way in which that it did within the Chilly Conflict. Neither is Washington relying on Turkey to comprise Russia or to function a companion within the Center East. Trump might want Turkey’s assist to understand a few of his (ever-changing) aims within the area, however he has loads of different companions within the neighborhood. Because of this, each events can reside with ambiguity, work collectively when pursuits overlap, and comply with disagree the place they don’t.
