It’s not every single day {that a} U.S. president publicly calls for the return of a navy base from a former adversary. However that’s precisely what occurred final week, when President Donald Trump stated that his administration is “attempting to get” Bagram again from the Taliban.
The assertion sparked a mixture of shock and skepticism. As soon as the nerve middle of U.S. navy operations in Afghanistan, the Bagram Airfield was deserted through the messy 2021 U.S. withdrawal and shortly taken over by the Taliban. Now, 4 years later, it has resurfaced as Trump’s newest foreign-policy gambit, rekindling debate over the USA’ unfinished enterprise within the Taliban-controlled Afghanistan.
Trump, who has repeatedly raised the problem of management of Bagram because the withdrawal, now seems to be ramping up his push. “We would like it again and we wish it again quickly. Straight away,” he warned on Sept. 20.
Media experiences point out that the White Home is actively weighing choices to reestablish a U.S. foothold on the base, citing each its counterterrorism worth and its proximity to key Chinese language nuclear services. Situated 40 miles north of Kabul, the bottom stays totally able to supporting massive plane, drones and surveillance platforms, particular operations forces, and rapid-response missions. The place its loss got here to represent American retreat, regaining Bagram may mark a daring reassertion of U.S. energy in a turbulent area.
Whereas the Taliban shortly rejected Trump’s concept, the problem is way from settled. Lately, inner fissures inside the group have widened, pushed by rising discontent over the emir’s consolidation of energy and his merging of clerical authority with govt management over coverage and personnel selections.
Mixed with mounting financial desperation and the escalating risk from the Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-Ok), fractures are reshaping the Taliban’s inner dynamics and creating potential openings for sensible engagement. Given the regime’s obsession with survival and stress from inside its personal ranks, Trump’s concept will not be as far-fetched as it might appear. His staff may exploit these cracks by way of a right combination of incentives, back-channel diplomacy, and stress from regional actors. Each symbolically and operationally, Bagram stays one of many few mounted belongings able to reinserting U.S. affect throughout the South Asia and Central Asia areas.
“If Afghanistan doesn’t give Bagram Airbase again to those who constructed it, the USA of America, BAD THINGS ARE GOING TO HAPPEN!!!” Trump wrote in a Sept. 20 Fact Social put up. That blunt risk alerts a potential recalibration of U.S. posture in a area the place U.S. affect has sharply declined. For the reason that withdrawal, IS-Ok has quickly expanded operations, terrorist protected havens have resurfaced, and U.S. intelligence assortment has weakened significantly. In the meantime, China, Russia, and Iran have moved aggressively to fill the vacuum.
The case for returning to Bagram is pushed by pressing safety necessities. U.S. authorities assessments warn that IS-Ok may rebuild its exterior operations capabilities inside months if left unchecked. With no bodily U.S. presence in Afghanistan, the present over-the-horizon mannequin, which depends on distant bases within the Gulf, is a poor substitute for the proximity and on-the-ground visibility wanted for efficient counterterrorism.
The administration now faces a number of potential pathways, every fraught with dangers and trade-offs. The actual problem lies in structuring an association that delivers significant worth with out inviting mission creep or open-ended commitments. Trump’s penchant for transactional diplomacy may give him a novel benefit in hanging such a deal.
Essentially the most direct route ahead could be a negotiated settlement with the Taliban, both as a stand-alone deal or an enlargement of the prevailing U.S.-Taliban Doha framework. In change for partial or full entry to Bagram, Washington may supply what quantities to a survival bundle that features financial help, counterterrorism cooperation, and gradual steps towards political normalization and easing sanctions. The Taliban would nearly definitely demand worldwide legitimacy, beginning with a seat on the United Nations, in addition to reduction from monetary and journey restrictions. A extra distant however vital alternative lies in potential U.S. funding in a lithium mine in Afghanistan. If included within the broader deal, it may ship substantial advantages for each side and plug Afghanistan into world provide chains.
Whereas hard-liners, particularly the emir in Kandahar, are anticipated to withstand any lodging with Washington, different factions inside the Taliban’s uneasy coalition could privately favor such a deal as each tolerable and worthwhile. The emir, nevertheless, is neither untouchable nor invincible, notably if he refuses to compromise and faces dissent from inside his personal ranks. Though direct dialogue with the emir stays largely untested, the regime’s broader actuality as an remoted, cash-strapped hermit state more and more weak to IS-Ok gives significant leverage. These circumstances could make a negotiated opening extra believable than it’d seem.
A extra politically acceptable various may contain a third-party association, doubtlessly outsourcing Bagram’s administration to a Gulf middleman corresponding to Qatar or the United Arab Emirates, a NATO member corresponding to Turkey, or perhaps a Central Asian accomplice corresponding to Uzbekistan. These international locations preserve shut ties with the Taliban, have accepted regime-appointed ambassadors, and stay shut safety companions of Washington.
Beneath such an association, Bagram could possibly be repurposed as a joint counterterrorism hub and coaching facility, technically overseen by an exterior accomplice however functionally enabling U.S. entry for intelligence assortment, surveillance, and operations.
Qatar, for example, already hosts a U.S. pursuits part inside its embassy in Afghanistan and facilitates back-channel talks with the Taliban. Uzbekistan, which shares a border with Afghanistan, nonetheless homes dozens of U.S.-supplied fight helicopters and different navy tools beforehand supplied to the previous Afghan authorities, belongings that the Taliban are desirous to get better. However extra importantly, Uzbekistan faces severe threats from at the least 4 Uzbek jihadi teams, all of which take pleasure in Taliban sanctuary and preserve operational ties with al Qaeda, IIS-Ok, and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham in Syria. These issues have pushed Uzbekistan to hunt a better counterterrorism partnership with Washington.
In the meantime, the United Arab Emirates manages 4 of Afghanistan’s principal airports, together with Kabul Worldwide Airport. It oversees techniques and expertise, terminal operations, and floor companies, giving it appreciable visibility into Taliban logistics and motion. This function, mixed with the UAE’s deepening technological footprint in Afghanistan’s telecommunications and power sectors, additional enhances its perception into the regime’s inner workings. The UAE has additionally hosted Taliban dissenters and enjoys high-level, direct entry to senior Taliban management, together with throughout delicate engagements corresponding to hostage negotiations.
Such a third-party association may present Washington each authorized and diplomatic cowl whereas minimizing the optics of direct engagement with the Taliban. For the Taliban, it may present a face-saving narrative by permitting them to current the partnership as engagement with a fellow Muslim nation quite than with the USA itself. Whereas they could demand some visibility into U.S. actions on the base or search to restrict sure operations, particularly these concentrating on al Qaeda, a workable compromise may nonetheless protect the USA’ core counterterrorism capabilities on the bottom.
A 3rd choice may draw on the post-9/11 precedent with Pakistan, the place the USA operated for years from airfields in Jacobabad and Pasni below the nominal management of the Pakistani authorities. That association confirmed how even adversarial or uneasy companions can collaborate when the suitable incentives or threats are on the desk. An analogous low-visibility setup at Bagram may allow U.S. personnel to function discreetly in designated zones, presumably with Taliban-appointed liaisons serving as intermediaries. Although politically delicate, such quiet engagement would mirror present types of U.S.-Taliban interplay, starting from back-channel coordination on migration and humanitarian assist to restricted dialogues on counterterrorism and narcotics points, together with the sharing of actionable concentrating on info. If the Taliban have been to refuse such an association, Pakistan may as soon as once more emerge as a fallback accomplice by offering U.S. entry to services inside its personal territory.
One other various may contain a hybrid civilian-military consortium, a three way partnership between choose Gulf, Taliban, and U.S. stakeholders. On this model, Bagram could possibly be rebranded as a civilian logistics, upkeep, and aviation hub with embedded safety and intelligence elements managed by American personnel. Whereas unconventional, comparable gray-zone basing preparations have confirmed efficient in locations corresponding to Somalia, Iraq, Djibouti, and the Sahel.
If formal channels fail, the USA may go for a covert presence by leveraging intelligence networks, paramilitary items, or personal contractors. This method may construct on present relationships with former Afghan strike items, regional intermediaries, and even Taliban defectors. It may resemble the CIA-run Counterterrorism Pursuit Groups, who have been recruited within the early days of the Afghan marketing campaign and remained lively in Afghanistan till the Taliban takeover. Lots of the items’ members have since been resettled in the USA and accomplice international locations.
Whereas the dangers of publicity and Taliban retaliation could be vital, this method is in line with the U.S. observe document of working in hostile environments by way of deniable means. Nevertheless, such efforts may face severe challenges, together with the rising risk of Taliban hostage-taking involving U.S. twin nationals, a recurring challenge that has already entangled Washington in ransom-driven hostage diplomacy with the regime.
Past counterterrorism, the big-picture rationale for the USA wanting Bagram again is simply as compelling. China is quickly deepening its footprint in Afghanistan, pursuing rare-earth minerals and embedding itself in vital infrastructure. Russia, having moved early to formally acknowledge the Taliban authorities, is increasing its safety engagement. Iran continues to maneuver weapons, fighters, and foreign money throughout Afghan borders with little resistance. India, although sidelined, is watching with concern. And Pakistan—lengthy a disruptive participant in Afghan affairs—is readjusting its place amid rising instability inside Pakistan and rising tensions with the Taliban over cross-border sanctuaries involving the Pakistani Taliban.
To make certain, any U.S. return to Bagram could be seen by China and Russia as a direct problem to their regional affect, doubtless prompting them to stress the Taliban to withstand such a transfer. Iran would oppose any U.S. reentry outright. Pakistan could be pressured to stability its ties with the Taliban and its dependency on China to reap potential good points from renewed cooperation with Washington. India, although unlikely to say so publicly, would quietly welcome it. In the end, the Taliban perceive that no nation can, nor would, outmatch the size of U.S. funding or rival its affect.
Ultimately, getting Bagram again received’t be simple. But when the Trump administration embraces a practical cut price and explores artistic basing preparations, it may safe a significant foothold with out slipping into one other pricey entanglement. In a area the place the USA’ absence has created a harmful vacuum—and the place the Taliban have now held energy for the total size of a U.S. presidential time period—reestablishing entry to Bagram below new phrases and for brand spanking new priorities may symbolize a big foreign-policy win for the administration. It’s a chance value seizing.
