U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio is scheduled to travel to India this month, meeting with the other three foreign ministers of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or the Quad, and attempting to reset Washington’s ties with New Delhi. The visit comes at a fraught moment: Since last year, bilateral relations have come under considerable strain.
The stated reasons for Rubio’s visit include attending the Quad meeting—alongside ministers from Australia, Japan, and India—and discussing trade and energy issues with Indian officials. In New Delhi, Rubio will most likely meet with Indian Foreign Secretary Vikram Masri, who was in Washington last month, in addition to his formal counterpart, Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar.
U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio is scheduled to travel to India this month, meeting with the other three foreign ministers of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or the Quad, and attempting to reset Washington’s ties with New Delhi. The visit comes at a fraught moment: Since last year, bilateral relations have come under considerable strain.
The stated reasons for Rubio’s visit include attending the Quad meeting—alongside ministers from Australia, Japan, and India—and discussing trade and energy issues with Indian officials. In New Delhi, Rubio will most likely meet with Indian Foreign Secretary Vikram Masri, who was in Washington last month, in addition to his formal counterpart, Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar.
But the visit takes on added significance given the tribulations of the U.S.-India relationship and the fact that last year’s Quad leaders’ summit, which India was scheduled to host, was postponed due to these bilateral tensions.
U.S.-India ties started to fray shortly after the brief but intense India-Pakistan conflict a year ago, which followed a terrorist attack in Indian-administered Kashmir. U.S. President Donald Trump said his intercession brought the crisis to a swift end. India, which has long opposed external efforts to resolve its dispute with Pakistan, insisted that the United States played no role in facilitating the cease-fire.
It is widely believed that Trump was aggrieved that India refused to credit him for helping to end the conflict. Meanwhile, Pakistan took the opposite tack, lauding the U.S. president’s role in ensuring the cease-fire and even nominating him for the Nobel Peace Prize. Last June, Trump invited Pakistani Army chief Asim Munir to the White House for lunch. Understandably, this gesture was met with much distress and frustration in New Delhi.
A couple months later, in August, Trump imposed 50 percent tariffs on India—ostensibly because of its purchase of Russian oil and arms. Washington and New Delhi began trade talks, reaching an interim deal in February under which most Indian goods would face a U.S. tariff of 18 percent. The U.S. Supreme Court decision to strike down many of Trump’s tariffs effectively nullified this agreement.
Nonetheless, considerable damage was already done to the bilateral relationship owing to Trump’s actions, from inviting Munir to the White House to his hardball trade tactics, which caused widespread pain across a range of Indian industries. Decades of trust carefully nurtured by both Democratic and Republican administrations was lost.
Trump’s crackdown on access to H-1B visas, which allow foreign professionals to work in the United States for up to five years, also roiled the bilateral relationship last year. Under pressure on immigration from his base, Trump dramatically limited access to these visas by imposing a $100,000 fee on employers submitting H-1B petitions. The policy had a disproportionate effect on Indian nationals, who accounted for more than 70 percent of H-1B visa approvals in 2025.
Finally, another issue recently emerged that is likely to make Rubio’s interlocutors in New Delhi wary of his outreach: Pakistan became an unlikely mediator between the United States and Iran. The Trump administration has welcomed this role. Though a 21-hour meeting with Iranian negotiators in Islamabad in April failed to result in a substantial outcome, Pakistan remains involved in efforts to end the war. India has found itself sidelined in the process.
As a result of these factors, Rubio is likely to face a polite but frosty reception in New Delhi, and Trump has made his task even more difficult. Last month, the U.S. president reposted remarks from a conservative radio host, Michael Savage, in which he referred to China and India as “hellhole” countries and Indians as “gangsters with laptops.”
India, which had displayed restraint in not engaging with previous inflammatory remarks from Trump himself, called the comments “obviously uninformed, inappropriate and in poor taste.” This reflects a shift. In his first term—despite reportedly mocking Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in private—Trump did not publicly disparage India. But now, Trump and his officials have used condescending language when negotiating with India on trade issues, even while praising Modi individually.
Likely with a view toward deflecting growing irritation in India with this rhetoric, the U.S. Embassy in New Delhi issued a statement calling India a “great country.” But it is far from evident that this effort will serve as a sufficient emollient.
Rubio cannot paper over these differences as he meets with his Indian counterparts. Both sides can nevertheless ensure that bilateral ties do not continue to drift into more troubled waters. The United States and India share several economic, strategic, and diplomatic concerns—which, if deftly handled, can ensure that that the relationship does not lose its moorings.
The United States remains India’s principal trading partner; in turn, India is the United States’ 10th-largest trading partner. India’s investments in the United States across sectors ranging from pharmaceuticals to energy are responsible for the creation of more than 400,000 jobs. This economic partnership should remain strong, especially as considerable uncertainty looms over the U.S.-China trade and investment climate.
The security partnership between the United States and India, which Rubio will no doubt address in New Delhi, remains consequential. In this regard, amid the turbulence in bilateral relations on other fronts, the two sides extended a defense cooperation pact for another decade for the third time last October. Simultaneously, the two sides reaffirmed their commitment to a “free and open Indo-Pacific region.”
There is little reason to believe that, despite the apparent tensions, this key shared concern will be jettisoned—especially if Rubio has the mandate to revitalize the Quad. However, in keeping with Trump’s “America First” foreign-policy orientation, he might press Quad partners to bear more responsibilities and burdens. Indeed, the other foreign ministers could use the occasion to ascertain if the United States still views the Quad as a valuable entity in the Indo-Pacific.
Finally, because U.S. diplomatic ties to traditional European allies are under some strain, it may be especially important to ensure that relations with India can be kept on an even keel. It is apparent that India has been marginalized in the fitful U.S. negotiations with Iran. But India is in a rare position where it has a robust relationship with Israel and a working partnership with Iran. If Pakistan fails, perhaps India could play a meaningful role in defusing tensions.
During much of the Cold War and even beyond, Washington and New Delhi could afford to ignore each other as their relationship lacked economic, strategic, or diplomatic ballast. Despite the recent tensions that have characterized the partnership, its foundations remain fundamentally sound. The task before Rubio is to see if he can convince his interlocutors that they can still jointly build on this existing groundwork.
