Two recent developments—one in New Delhi and another off the coast of Sri Lanka—could have important consequences for the future of U.S.-India relations as President Donald Trump wages war in Iran.
On March 5, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau spoke at the annual Raisina Dialogue, an Indian government-supported conference that brings together policymakers, journalists, and analysts to discuss global issues. Landau reiterated the Trump administration’s commitment to pursuing a collaborative relationship with India while adhering to an “America First” agenda.
Two recent developments—one in New Delhi and another off the coast of Sri Lanka—could have important consequences for the future of U.S.-India relations as President Donald Trump wages war in Iran.
On March 5, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau spoke at the annual Raisina Dialogue, an Indian government-supported conference that brings together policymakers, journalists, and analysts to discuss global issues. Landau reiterated the Trump administration’s commitment to pursuing a collaborative relationship with India while adhering to an “America First” agenda.
However, Landau made a point to add that the administration would not help to boost India’s material capabilities: “India should understand that we are not going to make the same mistakes with India that we made with China 20 years ago in terms of saying, we are going to let you develop all these markets, and then, the next thing we know, you are beating us in a lot of commercial things,” he said.
The Raisina Dialogue opened in New Delhi just days after the war in Iran had begun, raising the stakes of the debates taking place there. The irony of Landau underscoring Trump’s America First foreign-policy agenda is that the conflict, unless swiftly concluded, will lead the United States into yet another quagmire in the Middle East.
The official Indian reaction to Landau’s comments was swift: “India’s rise will be determined solely by India,” Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar said in a statement on the conference’s last day, without explicitly mentioning the speech. One can surmise that Jaishankar sought to avoid a possible pique with the Trump administration while still conveying his displeasure to both Washington and the Indian public.
Meanwhile, the Indian National Congress party, the country’s main political opposition, bluntly stated that Landau’s remarks were “not only insulting but also anti-India” in a post on its official social media accounts. The party’s reaction wasn’t surprising, in part stemming from a degree of reflexive anti-Americanism that has long strained the party’s political culture.
But the comments also reflected the misgivings of many in the Congress party who believe that Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government has been too eager to engage with the Trump administration and failed to protect India’s national interests—most notably in the recently concluded trade agreement with the United States.
A day before Landau’s speech, a U.S. submarine sank an Iranian naval vessel, the IRIS Dena, off the coast of Sri Lanka, killing at least 87 people. The warship was returning to Iran following a multilateral naval exercise hosted by India that included 18 ships from countries friendly to New Delhi. Segments of Indian civil society reacted harshly. Some argued that the episode punctured Modi’s claims that India was a net security provider in its littoral waters.
The ship was in international waters, and it appears the U.S. torpedo attack did not violate international law. But that it happened when the ship was headed home from a major exercise—in which the United States itself was a participant—has upset many people in India. The Congress party took Modi to task for his failure to condemn the sinking of the Iranian vessel.
Apart from the opposition sensing an opportunity, there are more compelling reasons why the Indian government cannot remain neutral amid the U.S. and Israeli attacks against Iran. India has a substantial domestic Shiite population who are aggrieved in the wake of Shiite cleric and Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s assassination. India also receives substantial remittances from expatriate workers in the Middle East, including Iran, and imports a significant amount of oil from the region.
Against that backdrop, it’s no wonder U.S.-India relations are fraught. Landau’s comments stand in striking contrast to even past Republican administrations: Under President George W. Bush, when Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice visited New Delhi, she stated that the United States was interested in seeing India rise as a great power.
Subsequent leaders did not back away from this goal—and Trump did little to slow the progress in the bilateral relationship during his first term. On the contrary, the two sides signed a key defense agreement that had been held up for some time. Trump also seemed to develop a personal rapport with Modi, holding a rally with him in Houston, Texas, during a state visit. Modi reciprocated this warmth when Trump visited India in February 2020.
As a result, Landau’s speech was not received well in New Delhi, and the sinking of the Iranian warship has further inflamed these sentiments. Given India’s long-standing efforts to maintain a semblance of normal relations with Iran while bolstering its ties to the United States, the current moment is an important setback. India’s nonaligned foreign policy, which seeks to maintain sound relations with a range of international partners, has now suffered a body blow.
It is obviously in the interest of the Modi government to adopt a nonconfrontational approach toward the United States—it can’t afford to alienate the Trump administration. Far too much is at stake, from trade and investment to defense ties. New Delhi’s recent decisions demonstrated a willingness to negotiate and compromise, resulting in a February trade agreement. (The eventual fate of the accord, however, is now in abeyance after the recent U.S. Supreme Court ruling on Trump’s tariffs.)
Still, the Modi government faces increasingly vocal domestic dissent when it comes to working with the Trump administration. In the past, it could fend off these criticisms and pursue policies that it deemed to be beneficial. However, criticism is growing louder—and it is not confined to the opposition benches. Even before the Iran war, influential and relatively nonpartisan Indian politicians were sounding the alarm about the downturn in U.S.-India ties.
U.S.-India relations, which entered troubled waters after Trump imposed harsh tariffs last year, may now face more turbulence. Key members of India’s attentive public are now explicitly warning Modi that his government’s unwillingness to express its reservations about the war against Iran could jeopardize India’s enduring national interests.
It is too early to say if these misgivings will lead to a permanent drift in bilateral ties. The Trump administration’s seeming indifference to what India deems to be its legitimate foreign-policy concerns—not to mention a rebuke to its quest for great-power status—seems to show that decades of bipartisan efforts to forge a strong partnership could now be at needless risk.
