Welcome to Foreign Policy’s China Brief.
The highlights this week: China reacts to the war in Iran, the United States diverts military assets from the Asia-Pacific, and the National People’s Congress convenes in Beijing for its annual two sessions meetings.
Welcome to Foreign Policy’s China Brief.
The highlights this week: China reacts to the war in Iran, the United States diverts military assets from the Asia-Pacific, and the National People’s Congress convenes in Beijing for its annual two sessions meetings.
China’s Predictable Play in Iran
As war erupts in the Middle East again, China is again keeping its distance—offering rhetorical condemnation but not much direct support for Iran after U.S. and Israeli strikes began over the weekend.
Some analysts have predictably attempted to frame the war in Iran as part of a coherent U.S. grand strategy toward China. This commentary is driven more by careerism than serious analysis, but it reflects a broader misunderstanding of the forces that shape Chinese attitudes.
The truth is that China is an unentangled superpower, in contrast to the United States and the Soviet Union. It has only one formal mutual defense pact—albeit a troublesome one—with North Korea. Beijing is less willing to commit to permanent relationships, especially when it comes to defense, and more comfortable cutting its losses than Washington.
Still, U.S. analysts sometimes seem desperate to portray countries such as Iran or Venezuela as pillars of Chinese grand strategy—or imagine scenarios in which China becomes mired in a quagmire like the war in Afghanistan.
China lacks entanglements in part because it also lacks the persistent foreign lobbying that dominates U.S. politics. Chinese politics are overwhelmingly domestic, suspicion of foreign influence runs deep, and the inner workings of the Chinese Communist Party are opaque to outsiders. Instead, Beijing has an intense internal lobbying presence—by both private and state-owned firms, as well as provincial governments.
Furthermore, nothing in Beijing compares to Washington’s dense ecosystem of think tanks and advocacy institutions, which help sustain long-term foreign lobbying efforts. At best, foreign governments may benefit from an experienced and well-placed Chinese official with personal affinities for a region, such as diplomat Qiu Xiaoqi, who has long served in Latin America.
None of this means China is indifferent to foreign conflicts. It has real material and geopolitical interests at stake in the Iran war.
Roughly 50 percent to 60 percent of Chinese oil imports come from the Gulf. In theory, China could use its influence in Yemen to pressure the Houthis to curb attacks on shipping, at least for Chinese vessels. But the collapse of the Islamic Republic or a prolonged war would likely make the Strait of Hormuz dangerous for all traffic. China’s substantial oil stockpile offers it some cushion, but it’s hardly a permanent solution.
One area of the conflict where China may look to score points is in protecting its citizens. The successful evacuation of Chinese nationals from Libya in 2011, for instance, was a domestic triumph. As of Tuesday, China had evacuated most Chinese citizens from Iran, according to the Global Times. Beijing may aim for a larger regional evacuation—a stark contrast with the U.S. messaging toward its citizens in the Gulf.
Chinese strategists have long assumed that a distracted Washington is good for Beijing. The United States’ mass expenditure of munitions in the opening phases of attack is already straining its supply chains. If China wanted to raise the pressure further, it could tighten controls on rare earth exports again.
But such a move is unlikely, given the current U.S.-China diplomatic thaw—and since a sharp escalation might accelerate U.S. efforts to reshore its critical mineral supply, ultimately weakening Chinese leverage. For now, China appears content to wait and see just how big of a mess the United States has gotten itself into.
What We’re Following
Military purge fallout. Chinese President Xi Jinping’s military purge reaches further than previously understood. A new report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies estimates that more than half of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) leadership has been affected. That figure rises dramatically for three-star generals or above: Of the 47 people who have held such roles since 2022, 41 have reportedly been removed, including those who were purged after retirement.
This has created a significant leadership vacuum in the PLA, with only 11 of 52 key positions currently occupied. Xi hasn’t moved to fill these vacancies—perhaps because he was caught off-guard by the level of corruption among his own appointees and is uncertain of whom to trust.
The U.S. Asia-Pacific presence. The widening Iran conflict has diverted U.S. military resources from the Asia-Pacific, further marginalizing the China hawks in the White House and unsettling regional allies, including Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.
It’s worth remembering that even the most alarming Chinese contingency—an invasion of Taiwan—would have weeks or months of warning and military buildup. An amphibious landing of that scale can’t be launched suddenly, and U.S. naval resources could be repositioned back to the region if necessary.
But if war in the Middle East sparks a wider drawdown of U.S. missile defense assets, it could jeopardize relations with South Korea, which endured years of Chinese retaliation after agreeing to deploy a U.S. missile defense system in 2016.
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Two sessions. On Wednesday, China’s rubber-stamp parliament, the National People’s Congress, convenes its annual two sessions gathering. Though the meetings are largely perfunctory, they sometimes offer insight into Beijing’s political and economic goals.
This year’s focus is expected to be economic recovery, including the setting of GDP targets—likely a modest (though still inflated) 5 percent or below. In the wake of military purges, one detail to watch is empty seats. If the purges extend beyond the PLA to regular officials at similar scale, many delegates will be absent.
Chinese air defense. Since Israel’s war with Iran last June, rumors have swirled that China would provide Iran with air defense support. Beijing denied those claims, and no clear evidence has emerged that such systems were delivered or deployed.
That hasn’t stopped Indian outlets from alleging that a prominent Chinese air defense system was recently fielded in Iran but performed poorly. That narrative appears colored by nationalism: During last May’s brief India-Pakistan clash, that Chinese-made system downed several Indian aircraft.
Iran has reportedly been trying to purchase missiles from China. But whether a deal advances remains uncertain, as well as if there will be a stable Iranian government left to execute it.
