India and the United States reached an interim trade agreement earlier this month—after months of public wrangling and various intemperate statements on the part of some U.S. officials, ranging from Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick to trade advisor Peter Navarro.
In the wake of the announcement, key members of India’s principal opposition party, the Indian National Congress, have predictably attacked elements of the deal, arguing that the Bharatiya Janata Party-led government has conceded too much to the United States and received little in return. Some have even characterized the accord as a “surrender” to U.S. demands.
India and the United States reached an interim trade agreement earlier this month—after months of public wrangling and various intemperate statements on the part of some U.S. officials, ranging from Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick to trade advisor Peter Navarro.
In the wake of the announcement, key members of India’s principal opposition party, the Indian National Congress, have predictably attacked elements of the deal, arguing that the Bharatiya Janata Party-led government has conceded too much to the United States and received little in return. Some have even characterized the accord as a “surrender” to U.S. demands.
One of the critics’ principal allegations is that the deal threatens Indian farmers by opening up agricultural markets to U.S. farm products. Indian Commerce Minister Piyush Goyal, New Delhi’s key trade negotiator, has insisted that the accord protects the interests of vulnerable farmers by excluding U.S. dairy and poultry from the concessions. But this debate cannot be settled soon, especially because many of the particulars of the accord remain to be sorted out.
India and the United States will likely succeed in tackling remaining differences and move to implement the agreement. But the damage done to the careful progress in bilateral ties of the last two decades will not be easily repaired. Regardless of political affiliation, many in India’s foreign-policy establishment see the deal with the United States in mostly transactional terms. It enables India to escape U.S. President Donald Trump’s steep tariffs and thereby provides relief to beleaguered industries, from textiles to aircraft parts.
As former senior Indian diplomat Shyam Saran predicted late last year, the U.S.-India relationship will not simply bounce back as a result of this accord. U.S. outreach to Pakistan in the wake of its conflict with India last May seemed to significantly diminish the trust that New Delhi had in Washington. Furthermore, the United States appears to have walked back if not walked away from its Indo-Pacific strategy, as underscored by the new U.S. National Security Strategy.
The residual mistrust that characterized bilateral ties between India and the United States during the Cold War now seems to be returning with renewed vigor. This tension steadily dissipated after U.S. President Bill Clinton condemned Pakistan’s incursions across the Line of Control in disputed Kashmir in 1999. Clinton’s statement came at a critical juncture for the relationship, as previous U.S. presidents had failed to censure Pakistan for its military misadventures.
Later, in 2008, deft negotiations with President George W. Bush’s administration accomplished a breakthrough: the U.S.-India civilian nuclear accord. In one fell swoop, this agreement removed a major stumbling block in bilateral ties, enabling India to enter the realm of normal global nuclear commerce while maintaining its nuclear weapons program. The Bush administration expended considerable political capital to reach the deal, as it saw India as a strategic bulwark against China.
In its wake, U.S.-India relations were mostly on a glide path. During U.S. President Barack Obama’s second term, the United States accorded India the rare status of a “major defense partner,” laying the foundations for cooperation on a number of emerging defense technologies. Despite Trump’s complaints about India’s trade practices, during his first term, U.S. policy toward India did not fundamentally change. Indeed, Trump and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi appeared to develop a personal rapport.
This bipartisan consensus endured under U.S. President Joe Biden, and as he left office, Indian officials lost no time in reaching out to the new Trump administration. Modi visited Washington a year ago and became one of the first world leaders to undertake such a trip during Trump’s second term. Commentators argued that the visit highlighted the significance that the United States attached to its relationship with India.
Despite this, grumbling about India’s trade practices started to emerge from key players in the Trump administration. But no real disruption in the relationship appeared to loom on the horizon, even as Trump announced 26 percent tariffs on India last April, alongside protectionist measures targeting most U.S. trade partners.
Then, an extraneous event—a deadly terrorist attack in Indian-administered Kashmir—set into motion a chain of events that led to an abrupt rupture in the U.S.-India relationship. In the wake of the attack, India launched strikes in Pakistani territory using drones and combat aircraft; Pakistan swiftly retaliated. There is indisputable evidence that the Trump administration offered its good offices to end the conflict. In any case, the skirmishes stopped.
As the crisis concluded, Trump said that his intervention was critical in ensuring the cease-fire. India, which has a neuralgic hostility toward any third-party intervention in the Kashmir dispute, promptly moved to challenge Trump’s claim. Matters quickly started on a downward spiral, as Trump invited Pakistani Army chief Asim Munir to the White House and lauded him for his role in ending the conflict. (Munir, meanwhile, suggested that Trump be awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.)
To no surprise, in India, Trump’s gesture evoked long-held memories about the U.S. propensity to overlook Pakistan’s long-standing ties to terrorist groups. Critics of the U.S.-India partnership in New Delhi went into overdrive insisting that Trump’s choices reflected deep-seated American perfidy. Shortly afterward, Trump imposed additional 25 percent tariffs on India, ostensibly as a penalty for its purchases of Russian oil. The U.S.-India relationship was now in free fall.
The paucity of trust in U.S.-India relations has a long history. The friction with the Trump administration has been so jarring that Modi’s government is likely to face significant domestic opposition if it attempts to set aside the rancor of recent months once the wrinkles in the trade deal are resolved. Despite the unhappiness of some Indian farmers, which has already resulted in protests, it is far from clear that India is in any position to boost trade with the United States to $500 billion, as per the agreement.
The trade deal may, at best, limit the U.S.-India relationship from plummeting to unknown depths. However, Indian mistrust and misgivings about U.S. foreign-policy choices have returned to the fore. The conclusion of the trade deal will not act as a salve to the body blow that Trump’s decisions have delivered to the Indian polity, from his dalliance with Pakistan to the inflammatory statements from White House officials.
Long-held doubts about American fickleness and unreliability are now surfacing with a vengeance in India’s political arena. A carefully tended partnership that was once mutually beneficial is now at substantial risk.
